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DEFICIENT TREATMENT OF DEFICIENCY
CLAIMS: GILMORE WOULD HAVE REPENTED
DONALD J. RAPSON*
Professor Grant Gilmore was one of the Co-Reporters for the original
Article 9-and its primary drafter.' His brilliant treatise, Security Interests in
Personal Property,2 stands as the leading exposition of the history of secured
transactions law and its emergence as Article 9-Secured Transactions of the
Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"). To me, he has always been one of the
revered "gods" of the UCC.
I was introduced to Gilmore in 1954 by Professor John Hanna of
Columbia Law School, for whom I was a research assistant. Hanna was the
Consultant on Article 9 for the monumental study of the UCC by the New
York Law Revision Commission I vividly remember attending one of the
Commission hearings with Hanna where Gilmore exploded with anger and
fury at a bankers' association memorandum criticizing draft Article 9, which
he castigated for lack of intellectual honesty and for being crammed with
misstatements.4 Regrettably, there are not many commercial law teachers
around today with his passion and dedication to principle. Although I never
knew him well, we corresponded in later years and his pungent comments in
a letter about Article 4 offer a good insight to Gilmore's candor.5
* Senior Vice President and Assistant General Counsel of The CIT Group, Inc.; Adjunct
Professor of Law, New York University Law School; Lecturer-in-Law, Columbia Law School;
Member, Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code; Member, Article 9 Study
Committee of the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code; Member of the
Article 9 Drafting Committee of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(American Law Institute Representative); Adviser, Restatement of the Law Third Suretyship.
The views expressed in this Article are strictly the personal views of the author and should in no
way be attributed, directly or indirectly, expressly or by implication, to The CIT Group, Inc., or any of
its affiliate companies or to the directors, officers, or any other person employed by or associated with
any of these companies.
1. BARKLEY CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 1.01 [2][c], at 1-8 (rev. ed. 1993).
2. GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY (1965).
3. NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMM'N, N.Y. LEG. DOC. No. 65(A), REPORT OF THE LAW
REVISION COMMISSION TO THE LEGISLATURE RELATING TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1956).
4. My recollection is that this took place at a hearing in 1954 in New York City at the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York. It was undoubtedly recorded in the transcripts of the
Law Revision Commission.
5. Donald J. Rapson, Book Review, 41 BUS. LAW. 675, 676 (1986) (reviewing FRED H. MILLER
& ALVIN C. HARRELL, THE LAW OF MODERN PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND NOTES (1985)).
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Professor Gilmore was principally responsible for the exalted status of the
Article 9 "good faith purchaser" 6-- a doctrine I have questioned insofar as it
provides protections to nonreliance parties.7 In an overlooked late article,8
Gilmore expressed his concern and regrets about "some of the article 9
excesses" and described how he did penance as chairman of a special
committee of the National Bankruptcy Conference in connection with the
1978 Bankruptcy Code.9
I have represented secured creditors for most of my professional life,
twenty-six years of which were in private practice and the last thirteen years
were with The CIT Group, Inc. ("CIT"). 0 During that time, I have handled in
some capacity many real estate mortgage and personal property security
interest foreclosures, and the deficiency actions resulting therefrom. Much of
my thinking has been guided by the reputable practices of business people at
CIT and other lenders I represented in private practice and the rules and
6. Grant Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057
(1954).
7. Donald J. Rapson, A "Home Run" Application of Established Principles of Statutory
Construction: U.C.C. Analogies, 5 CARDOZO L. REV. 441,445-47 (1984).
8. Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code:
Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REV. 605 (198 1); see also ROBERT A. HILLMAN ET
AL., COMMON LAW AND EQUITY UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1.02, at 1-3 (1985).
Criticism of the Code has been particularly noteworthy because it has been led by the late Professor
Gilmore, the principal draftsman of Article 9 of the Code. Gilmore... made no effort to spare his
own child; indeed, he may as part parent have seen the Code's vices in magnified form.
Id.
9. Gilmore, supra note 8, at 627-28. Professor Homer Kripke, another architect of Article 9, and
the principal drafter of the 1972 Revisions to Article 9, upon learning of Gilmore's changed views
wrote:
Professor Grant Gilmore, for whom my admiration is unlimited, has recently astounded his old
comrades among the Code draftsmen by repudiating many of the conclusions of his splendid
article, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase [Gilmore, supra note 6].... I do not go
along, in general, with his changed viewpoint.... I do not understand what led Gilmore to his
current view.
Homer Kripke, A Reflective Pause Between UCC Past and UCC Future, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 603, 608
n.23 (1982).
10. While a student at Columbia Law School from 1951 to 1954, I did volunteer work for the
New York Legal Society in Harlem. One of the major problems I worked on was the defense of poor
consumers against banks suing to collect unpaid balances for goods sold under retail installment
contracts, where the goods were defective but the banks claimed that they were holders in due course,
free of that defense or recoupment claim. That experience had a profound impact on me in later years
when I represented secured creditors and motivated me to urge fair and equitable practices-which in
my view, are also "good business." The potential for consumer abuses arising from the holder in due
course doctrine was anticipated by UCC section 9-206(1), and the doctrine was, of course, eventually
abrogated in consumer transactions by the Federal Trade Commission. See Preservation of Consumers'
Claims and Defenses, 16 C.F.R. pt. 433 (1996).
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procedures of the New Jersey and New York courts.
For the last five years, as a member of the Article 9 Drafting Committee, I
have vigorously urged the adoption of a "fair value" rule to curb a sometimes
abusive practice that occurs in the enforcement of deficiency claims-
particularly in the circumstance where the secured party, or one with whom it
has a relationship, has "bought in" the collateral at the foreclosure sale. At
the outset there was surprising and sustained resistance to this proposal by the
Drafting Committee." There was, however, gradual progress in recent years,
described below, and most recently a gratifying decision by the Drafting
Committee, which leads me to believe that a revised Article 9 will afford
significant relief.'3
The fair value rule is not new and, in the past, has not been particularly
controversial. In essence, it allows the debtor to challenge the calculation of a
deficiency claim based on the foreclosure sale price because the fair value of
the collateral exceeded that price. Indeed, it is the majority rule in real estate
law,'4 was the statutory rule in personal property secured transactions law in
some states prior to the adoption of Article 9,15 and, in some states, continues
to be applied by decisional law in cases where the debtor contests the amount
of a deficiency claim.'6 In many states, however, and in the minds of some
11. See Donald J. Rapson, Repurchase (of Collateral?) Agreements and the Larger Issue of
Deficiency Actions: What Does Section 9-504(5) Mean?, 29 IDAHO L. REV. 649. 680-92 (1992-1993).
"Bought-in" is an euphemism that describes the result of the secured party being the successful
purchaser at a foreclosure sale. See infra note 22 explaining the secured party's "credit bid."
12. The Article 9 Drafting Committee is chaired by William M. Burke, Esq., of Los Angeles,
California. The Reporters are Professor Steven L. Harris of the Illinois Institute of Technology,
Chicago-Kent College of Law and Professor Charles W. Mooney, Jr., of the University of
Pennsylvania Law School. The other members of the Drafting Committee were initially William S.
Arnold, Esq. of Crossett, Arizona, Prof. Marion W. Benfield, Jr., of Wake Forest University Law
School, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, Trudi Bird, Esq. of Stonington, Connecticut, Dale G. Higer,
Esq. of Boise, Idaho. The Honorable William C. Hillman of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Boston,
Massachusetts, Prof. Randal Picker of the University of Chicago Law School, Donald J. Rapson, Esq.
of Livingston, New Jersey, Harry C. Sigman, Esq. of Los Angeles, California, Bradley Y. Smith, Esq.
of New York, New York, Edwin E. Smith, Esq. of Boston, Massachusetts, and Sandra S. Stem, Esq. of
New York, New York. Mr. Arnold died and Ms. Bird resigned. Michael Houghton, Esq. of
Wilmington, Delaware is a new member of the Committee.
13. See infra notes 82-116 and accompanying text.
14. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (MORTGAGES) § 8.4 (Tentative Draft No. 5, Mar. 18,
1996) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF MORTGAGES].
15. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:32-28 (repealed 1961); N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §§ 80-b, 81
(repealed 1964) (for conditional sales contracts with prices of $1500 or less); see also N.Y. LIEN LAW
§§ 239, 239-a to -1 (repealed 1964) (relating to chattel paper).
16. E.g., Citibank v. Errico, 597 A.2d 1091, 1097 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (even though
a deficiency action based on a foreclosure of a note and real estate mortgage securing a debt for
1997]
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secured transactions experts, it is not the rule under Article 9-and should not
be the rule. 7 How did this happen?
Much of the opposition came from people I highly respect who have an
abiding and sincere concern that adoption of a fair value rule is not only
unnecessary, but will result in judicial and economic inefficiency caused by
burdensome transaction costs. For me, such efficiency concerns should, as a
general rule, give way to individual justice and equity. A debtor should have
the right to challenge a deficiency claim by establishing that the fair value of
the collateral securing the obligation has not been credited against that
obligation. Moreover, I do not agree that such a right will produce the
asserted burdens and inefficiencies. Rather, I believe that the rule is consonant
with the existing practices and procedures of reputable and efficient secured
creditors and that its adoption will contribute to a general elevation of the
standards and operational procedures of secured financing. That, of course,
will inure to the benefit of debtors and other creditors and should ameliorate a
present source of friction and controversy. In short, no inherent inconsistency
exists between rules that facilitate and promote the ability of financiers to
provide secured credit and a rule that allows debtors to challenge deficiency
claims against them that are calculated on the basis of a foreclosure sale price
business or commercial purposes is not subject to the real property fair market value deduction statute,
in order "to preclude a windfall under general equitable principles," the debtor was entitled to "a
deficiency hearing at which the fair market value of the property at the time of foreclosure sale shall be
determined and the calculation of any credit to be allowed defendant in the deficiency action"); see
also Vito's Towing, Inc. v. Kemp, 652 A.2d 1259 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (fair value applied
to public sale of an abandoned car); FDIC v. Forte, 463 N.Y.S.2d 844, 850 (App. Div. 1983) (even
though the deficiency action based on a foreclosure sale of a real estate note and mortgage was
governed by UCC section 9-504 and not by the real property fair market value deduction statute, the
debtor was entitled to a hearing on the alleged "marked discrepancy between the foreclosure sale price
and the value of the property" because "a marked discrepancy between the sale price and the value of
the property will trigger close scrutiny even in the face of procedural propriety."). The challenge to the
foreclosure sale price of $165,000 in Forte was based upon appraisals of the real property that differed
by approximately $200,000. Id. at 850. Although the court termed the issue as one of commercial
reasonableness, the practical effect of the decision was to allow the debtor to use fair value concepts to
mount its challenge. New York courts that follow the rebuttable presumption rule allow the secured
party to recover a deficiency even though the foreclosure sale was commercially unreasonable, see
infra notes 66-67, and similarly use the difference between the "fair and reasonable value" of the
collateral and the amount of the debt as the measure of the deficiency. See Siemens Credit Corp. v.
Marvik Colour, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 686, 693 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Durante
Bros. & Sons, 433 N.Y.S.2d 574,576 (App. Div. 1980).
17. Steven 0. Weise, U.C.C. Article 9-Personal Property Secured Transactions, 47 BUS. LAW.
1593, 1639 (1992) ("U.C.C. Section 9-504(3) requires only that the procedures involved be
commercially reasonable and not that they generate a commercially reasonable price."); CLARK, supra
note 1, 1 4.08[8][b], at 4-165.
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that does not reasonably approximate the fair value of the collateral. I have
written this Article to advocate and urge that position.
In looking for guidance, I, of course, turned to Gilmore's treatise. Sure
enough, he discussed the issue which he described as a "really hard"'8 and a
"really serious problem":
The really serious problem is whether a secured party who has
complied with the notification and publicity requirements as well as
the formalities is privileged, if the lively concourse of bidders fails to
materialize, to buy the property in at a price which (let us assume,
arguendo) is a fraction of its real value....
[I]s there any obligation on a secured party, who has scheduled a
public sale, sent out the required notifications and provided appropriate
publicity, to bid more than a minimum price? 9
His conclusion as to how the issue should be resolved under Article 9 is
troubling and makes me shout, "Say it ain't so, Grant."' Gilmore appears to
have concluded that if the sale satisfies the procedural requirements of
"commercial reasonableness," the transaction is "unassailable."2 If, by
unassailable, he only meant that the sale and resulting transfer should not be
voided or otherwise disturbed because it was regularly conducted in
compliance with applicable procedural requirements, I would not be
concerned. But, if he also meant that the secured party can recover a
deficiency based upon its own "credit bid," even though the amount of that
bid is far less than the value of the collateral, that conclusion was wrong and
has led to unfortunate results. Article 9 should be revised to state a different
18. See 2 GILMORE, supra note 2, § 44.6, at 1245.
19. Id. § 44.6, at 1243-44. In my view, this discussion by Gilmore is indicative of the fact that
Article 9 offers very little guidance concerning the calculation of deficiency claims. As Gilmore also
acknowledged, "All that Article 9 has to say about liability for a deficiency is the simple statement in
§ 9-504(2) .. " Id. § 44.9.4, at 1261.
20. Baseball lore has it that a young Chicago White Sox fan upon learning that his hero,
"Shoeless" Joe Jackson, the great hitter, was a key figure in the 1919 "Black Sox" scandal to throw the
World Series, pleaded, "Say it ain't so, Joe!" Baseball history says that the boy actually said, "It ain't
true, Joe!" See Baseball pt. 3 (Pub. Broad. Television 1994).
21. 2 GILMORE, supra note 2, § 44.6, at 1245; see infra note 23 and accompanying text; cf UNIF.
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 3(b) (1984), 7A U.L.A. 639, 650 (1985) (protecting foreclosure sales
from being avoided for not satisfying the requirement of reasonably equivalent value, if there is a
"regularly conducted, non-collusive foreclosure sale"). The Fraudulent Transfer Act provision has
nothing to do with deficiency claims and in no way mandates that the foreclosure sale price be used in
calculating a deficiency claim. See infra notes 28-30, 53-54, 63 and accompanying text.
1997]
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rule that would negate such an interpretation and allow Professor Gilmore a
posthumous repentance.
Part I of this Article examines the fair value rule in the context of
Gilmore's perception of the commercial reasonableness concept. Part II
discusses the reaction to, and progress of, the fair value proposal in the Article
9 Drafing Committee.
I. COMMERCIAL REASONABLENESS AND THE CALCULATION OF
DEFICIENCY CLAIMS
A. The Issue
Let us put the issue in perspective with a hypothetical, but typical, set of
facts and two possible case scenarios. In developing this hypothetical, the
collateral involved is not described and relatively large dollar amounts are
used for the express purpose of not drawing a distinction between commercial
and consumer transactions. In my view, even though consumer
representatives have spoken out most forcefully about the problem, it is not
limited to consumer transactions.
Bank financed Debtor's purchase of Property for $100,000. The
Property is the collateral for Debtor's debt to Bank. After making
payments reducing the debt to $80,000, Debtor defaulted and Bank
proceeded to foreclose by public sale of the collateral pursuant to
applicable state law, viz. state mortgage foreclosure law if the collateral
was real property or UCC Article 9 if the collateral was personal property.
Bank gave proper notice to Debtor and any other required person and also
properly advertised the public sale in compliance with the procedural
requirements of applicable law (i.e., the procedure satisfied the
requirements for commercial reasonableness under UCC § 9-504). Prior
to holding the sale, Bank evaluated the collateral and determined that it
had a value ranging from a minimum of $50,000 to a maximum of
$60,000. As a consequence, Bank established a "let go" or "upset" price
of $50,000 which it was prepared to bid up to before it would let a third
party purchase the collateral.
Case #1
At the sale, Third Party purchased the collateral for $55,000. Thirty
days later Third Party sold the collateral to Fourth Party for $70,000.
Bank instituted a deficiency action against Debtor for $25,000.
[VOL. 74:491
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol75/iss1/13
1997] DEFICIENT TREATMENT OF DEFICIENCY CLAIMS 497
Case #2
At the sale, no other bidders appeared. Bank bought-in the
collateral with a credit bid" of $15,000. Thirty days later, Bank sold
the collateral to Fourth Party for $70,000. Bank instituted a deficiency
action against Debtor for $65,000.
Issue
DID THE FORECLOSURE SALE PRICES IN CASE #1 OF $55,000
AND IN CASE #2 OF $15,000 CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISH
DEFICIENCIES OF $25,000 IN CASE #1 AND $65,000 IN CASE
#2? OR MAY DEBTOR CHALLENGE THOSE SALE PRICES
ON THE GROUND THAT THE FAIR VALUE OF THE
COLLATERAL WAS $70,000 AND, IN ANY EVENT, NO LESS
THAN $60,000-THEREBY REDUCING THE DEFICIENCY TO
NO MORE THAN $20,000?
22. When the secured party "bids in" the collateral it does not pay money; rather, it just allows a
credit against the outstanding debt. That is called a credit bid. The same problem could arise if the sale
was to a person with whom the secured party has a "relationship," viz. a related party such as an insider
or affiliate, or one against whom the secured party has a right of recourse. This latter group would
include persons liable under a guaranty, endorsement, repurchase agreement, or the like, i.e.
"secondary obligors." Draft, Uniform Commercial Code Revised Article 9, Secured Transactions;
Sales of Accounts and Chattel Paper § 9-102(a)(34) (Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State
Laws, Feb. 1997) [hereinafter Feb. 1997 Draft, Art. 9], available at <http://www.law.upenn.edu/
library/ulc/ulc.htm> (visited on Mar. 31, 1997); see RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY
§ 1 (1)(a) (1996). In this circumstance, the purchaser may pay money, or, altematively, give the secured
party a credit against a separate obligation of the secured party. This could occur at a public or private
sale. See U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1995)) (generally, the secured party cannot be the purchaser at a private
sale). The purchase price "paid" by the insider or affiliate (see the definitions thereof in the Bankruptcy
Code, I 1 U.S.C. § 101(2),(31) (1994)) may bear no relationship to the fair value of the collateral.
Indeed, the problem is even more complicated in the circumstance where the purchaser is a secondary
obligor who is obligated to pay a purchase price equal to the amount of the outstanding obligation,
even though it is more than the fair value. In that instance, the secondary obligor should still be able to
recover a deficiency representing the excess of the amount of that purchase price over the fair value of
the collateral. See Rapson, supra note 11, at 674-80. The fair value proposal would accomplish this
purpose by requiring an adjustment of the purchase price, whatever it may be, and whether it is paid by
a credit bid or a payment by the secured party, insider, affiliate, or secondary obligor at a public or
private sale, to reflect the fair value of the collateral at the time of disposition. See infra note 88 and
accompanying text. The case of a secondary obligor who is obligated to pay the amount of the
outstanding obligation when that amount is in excess of the fair value of the collateral, could result in a
downward adjustment, thereby establishing a deficiency claim against the debtor. In almost all other
cases, however, any adjustment would be upwards, reducing the deficiency claim. Absent some
extraordinary circumstance, there should never be a downward adjustment when the secured party is
the purchaser at the foreclosure sale.
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B. Gilmore's Perspective
Professor Gilmore used a similar example that was different in some
significant respects:
Let us assume that, despite notification and publicity, neither the
debtor nor any other bidder appears at a public sale, held at an
appropriate time and place. The secured party bids in for $1000 the
collateral which secures a $10,000 obligation. Six months later, after
having collected the $9000 deficiency from the debtor, he resells the
erstwhile collateral for $10,000. Like any other transaction, this one
could be set aside on proof of fraud-for example, when the secured
party bid the collateral in for $1000, he already had the $10,000 resale
contract in his pocket. Apart from proof of fraud, the transaction
should be unassailable.'
Gilmore's example is somewhat unrealistic in positing a situation where
the secured party first collects the deficiency and subsequently resells the
collateral for ten times the amount of its bid price. Furthermore, we are not
told how the deficiency was collected. For example, did the debtor voluntarily
pay the deficiency? Or was there a suit for the deficiency, resulting in a
judgment, which the secured party was able to enforce by levy and execution
upon the debtor's assets?24
Although I am certainly troubled by the conclusion that "[a]part from
proof of fraud, the transaction should be unassailable,"2 Gilmore's example
of "fraud" is revealing. He suggests that if the secured party had a "$10,000
resale contract in his pocket" at the time of foreclosure, it would be fraud. 6 If
the secured party, instead, had "in his pocket" appraisals or his own estimated
valuation of $10,000, would Gilmore have called that fraud? How is that
significantly different? Missing from Professor Gilmore's discussion is any
recognition that secured parties routinely make or obtain valuations of the
collateral prior to the foreclosure sale in order to establish an upset or let go
price.2 This valuation is done so that the secured party will be prepared to
23. 2 GILMORE, supra note 2, § 44.6, at 1245.
24. If the debtor had assets which enabled it to pay off the $9000 debt six months later, could the
debt have been paid before repossession and foreclosure?
25. 2 GILMORE, supra note 2, § 44.6, at 1245.
26. Id.
27. Many foreclosure sales are handled by attorneys or independent repossession companies.
Before holding the sale, they require instructions from the secured creditor-client as to how high they
[VOL. 74:491
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"bid up" the collateral to a conservatively pre-determined amount before it
can let the collateral go to a third-party bidder. Otherwise, the secured party
will lose the meaningful benefit of the collateral.
Some secured lenders will commence the bidding by immediately going
to that let go price, particularly if it is apparent that there is going to be
genuine competitive bidding. But all too frequently, as Gilmore expressly
recognized, "neither the debtor nor any bidder appears" even though the
procedure in terms of "notification and publicity" was commercially
reasonable.28 In that circumstance, there is no compelling reason for the
secured party to "bid in" the let go price and it may merely make a pro forma
nominal or minimal credit bid to buy-in the collateral. The critical issue is
whether the secured party should be able to enforce a deficiency claim based
on that bid-especially if there is proof that the secured party had, or should
have, established a higher valuation at the time of the foreclosure sale.29
Despite the inference that can be drawn from Gilmore's use of the word
unassailable, I do not believe that he would have allowed Bank in Case #2 to
recover a deficiency of $65,000. It is one thing to say that the foreclosure sale
itself may not be challenged if the procedure was commercially reasonable;
but it is quite different to say that the amount of the bid used in calculating the
deficiency may not be challenged.3°
should bid, if necessary, in order to protect the client's equity in the collateral, i.e., the minimum value
that the client expects to realize. This is the let go or upset price.
28. 2 GILMORE, supra note 2, § 44.6, at 1245.
29. This should be readily ascertainable by discovery of the secured party's files. If there was
nothing in the file revealing the establishment of a let go or upset price, the secured party's actions
may be suspect as deviating from normal operating procedures. In some cases, it may be commercially
unreasonable for a secured party to sell the collateral without having made some effort to first
determine the value of the collateral. Some lenders may be concerned that the loan officer handling the
account might establish too high a value for the collateral in order to screen from his superiors a
greater loss. I have not seen that happen in my own experience. If, however, that is a realistic concern,
the secured party may then be hard-pressed to establish a lower value for the collateral and will be
unable to establish a larger deficiency. I do not consider this to be a valid objection to the fair value
proposal.
30. This is basically the distinction made in the RESTATEMENT OF MORTGAGES, supra note 14,
§§ 8.3, 8.4. Section 8.3(a) provides that "[a] foreclosure sale price obtained pursuant to a foreclosure
proceeding that is otherwise regularly conducted in compliance with applicable law does not render the
foreclosure defective unless the price is grossly inadequate." Id. § 8.3(a). Under section 8.4, however,
the debtor in a deficiency action has a right to request a determination of the "fair market value,"
which, if greater than the foreclosure sale price, can be offset against the deficiency to the extent of the
excess. Id. § 8A(d). In revising Article 9, however, I would not equate fair value with "fair market
value." See infra notes 61, 63 and accompanying text.
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Gilmore's rationale for his conclusion is as follows:
As the best way to produce a fair price, the Code relies on the
mechanism of a public sale, notification and publicity. If the
mechanism, properly operated, fails to produce any bids except the
secured party's[,]a reasonable inference is that there was no value to be
salvaged. It should be bome in mind that the debtor must receive
notification of the proposed sale. He is in at least as good a position as
the secured party to promote interest in the sale, even if he is unable to
raise the money that would be needed to redeem the collateral. If he
does nothing, his later allegation that the property was worth a great
deal more than the secured party paid for it should be received with a
degree of scepticism. 31
Putting aside for the moment my belief that this rationale is fundamentally
flawed, the "reasonable inference that there was no value to be salvaged,"'32
simply does not hold up in the context of the facts in the hypothetical, or for
that matter, in most Article 9 foreclosure sales resulting in the secured party
buying-in the collateral. Here, the establishment of an upset or let go price in
the range of $50,000 to $60,000 refutes any such inference-and the post-
foreclosure sale for $70,000 thirty days later confirms that refutation.
That is why I do not believe that Gilmore's statement really means that
Bank would have an unassailable33 right in Case #2 to recover a $65,000
deficiency based on its buy-in for $15,000. Notwithstanding Professor
Gilmore's extreme reliance on a foreclosure sale that, procedurally, was
commercially reasonable, he, of all people, knew that the courts would not
countenance the harshness of a statutory rule that conclusively established a
deficiency based upon a secured party's credit bid. Using his own phrase, the
courts would find ways to "ritually disembowel"'34 a statute that provided for
such a result.
This is so, even though the first sentence of UCC § 9-507(2) provides:
"The fact that a better price could have been obtained by a sale at a different
time or in a different method from that selected by the secured party is not of
itself sufficient to establish that the sale was not made in a commercially
31. 2 GILMORE, supra note 2, § 44.6, at 1245 (footnote omitted).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Grant Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13 CREIGHTON L. REv.
441,461 (1979).
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reasonable manner."35
That provision deals, however, with the commercial reasonableness of the
sale for purposes of determining whether a secured party has complied with
the procedural requirements and it does not deal with the calculation of the
deficiency-especially in the context of the secured party having been the
purchaser. The issue being discussed in this Article assumes that the
procedures of the sale have been commercially reasonable and focuses on the
deficiency claim. Indeed, it is not all that clear that the present Article 9
mandates the result suggested by Gilmore. For example, courts in New Jersey
and New York allow the debtor to challenge the amount of a deficiency claim
based upon the bid of the secured party in buying-in the collateral3 6
C. Gilmore's Reliance on Commercial Reasonableness
Gilmore's rationale for concluding that a procedurally correct foreclosure
sale--one that he describes as a "complicated ritual" 37-- is unassailable," was
based upon his belief that the commercial reasonableness requirement would
be a major improvement in foreclosure law and provide meaningfuil
protection to debtors against abusive deficiency claims. Consider Gilmore's
statement earlier in his treatise:
Sad experience has taught us that a power of sale, coupled with a
right to a deficiency judgment, can be harder on the debtor than strict
foreclosure ever was. The surplus to be returned to the debtor after the
sale is a glittering mirage; the deficiency judgment is the grim reality.
Furthermore the person who buys at the sale today, nine times out of
ten, is not our hero, the good faith purchaser for value, but the holder
of the security interest who pays not in cash but by a credit against the
debt.39
35. U.C.C. § 9-507(2) (1995).
36. See examples cited supra note 16.
37. 2 GILMORE, supra note 2, § 43.2, at 1190. In my experience, most foreclosure sales are a
"ritual," but not "complicated." Professional secured lenders establish standard operating procedures
for notice, publicity and the like, which industry practice and the courts generally accept as
commercially reasonable. Frequently, foreclosure sales are held at dealer lots, at locations at or near
offices of the institutional lender, and at or near sheriffs' offices. To me, many of these sales are
virtually indistinguishable, conceptually and procedurally, from real estate mortgage foreclosure sales,
notwithstanding the commercial reasonableness requirement for the former.
38. 2 GILMORE, supra note 2, § 44.6, at 1245.
39. Id. §43.2, at 1188-89.
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Gilmore was convinced that "the price-determining function of the
market" could be relied upon "to establish the fair value of the collateral."'10
His faith in the elixir of commercial reasonableness reflected Gilmore's belief
that this duty was equivalent to the fiduciary obligation of the secured party to
the debtor "to use his best efforts to see that the highest possible price is
received from the collateral."' Thus, it is quite clear that Gilmore not only
believed in the goal of realizing fair value, but was also convinced that the
Article 9 foreclosure duty of commercial reasonableness was the best way of
accomplishing that goal.
D. The Flaws in Gilmore's Rationale
Unfortunately, Professor Gilmore's faith in procedural commercial
reasonableness as the best way "to see that the highest possible price is
received from the collateral" '42 was much too optimistic and unrealistic.
Foreclosure procedures followed by most lenders are neither complicated
rituals nor regarded as performance of a lender's fiduciary obligation to the
debtor.43 Although as discussed below," the standard of commercial
40. Id. § 44.6, at 1240. Indeed, Gilmore viewed the practice of giving the debtor "credit against
the debt for the 'fair value' of the property, and not merely for the proceeds of the sale," as part of a
transition to decrees of strict foreclosure without any deficiency liability: "The best thing about the
Code default provisions may be that they are open-ended enough to allow the transition to continue
unimpeded." Id. § 43.2, at 1189.
41. Id. § 44.5, at 1232-34.
Courts have long been accustomed to formulate the duty of a pledgee or mortgagee who
sells collateral after default in terms of a fiduciary obligation. That standard was restated by the
New York Court of Appeals in 1955 in a carefully considered opinion by Judge Desmond:
"A pledgee's duty adequately to advertise his sale is not imposed by any statute but by
'the general maxims of equity' which govern pledges.... Equity assigns to pledgor and
pledgee a trust relationship with resulting obligations on the pledgee... One of those
obligations (on mortgagee and pledgee) is to "use every effort to sell the estate under every
possible advantage of time, place, and publicity." Perry on Trusts and Trustee [4th ed.] § 6020
... [citing In re Kiamie, 130 N.E.2d 745, 747 (N.Y. 1955)].
Whether the duty is phrased in terms of a fiduciary obligation or of "commercial
reasonableness," it could not be better put than in Judge Desmond's quotation from Perry: the Code
secured party, like his pre-Code counterparts, must "use every effort to sell the estate under every
possible advantage of time, place and publicity."
The facts of the Kiamie case afford an apt illustration of the way in which courts may be
expected to apply-and, in the author's opinion, should apply-the Code standard....
The Kiamie case is excellent law under the Code.
Id. at 1232-34 (citations omitted).
42. Id. at 1234.
43. Gilmore's excessive reliance on commercial reasonableness probably explains his view that
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reasonableness may have worked in Case #1 to achieve a fair value, it clearly
failed to do so in Case #2. Furthermore, Gilmore's rationale for saying that a
procedurally complying, commercially reasonable sale that, nevertheless,
failed to produce any bidders, should be unassailable, is flawed in at least
three important respects, any of which make recovery of a $65,000 deficiency
unjustified in Case #2:
1. No recognition is given to the customary practice and procedure by
secured parties of establishing upset or let go prices prior to the
foreclosure sale.
2. It is not unusual for bidders to fail to appear at a public sale, even
though Article 9's procedural requirements for "notification and
publicity" have been satisfied. There are valid reasons, unrelated to
procedure why prospective buyers do not appear or bid at such sales.
Hence, it is not reasonable to infer that the collateral has "no value to
be salvaged."'45
3. The notion that the defaulting debtor, who is usually financially
distressed, and often in a state of managerial and emotional disarray, is
"in at least as good a position as the secured party to promote interest
in the sale' 46 is erroneous and unrealistic.
Point 1 has already been discussed. 7 Point 2 was the case before Article 9
and continues to be the case today. Gilmore himself acknowledged that "the
person who buys at the sale today, nine times out of ten, is not our hero, the
good faith purchaser for value, but the holder of the security interest who pays
not in cash but by a credit against the debt."'4 In discussing the Article 9
provisions he candidly acknowledged:
noncompliance should result in the loss of any right to a deficiency claim, i.e., the "absolute bar rule."
See 2 GILMORE, supra note 2, § 44.9.4, at 1264. "we may conclude that the secured party's
compliance with the default provisions of Part 5 ... is a condition precedent to the recovery of a
deficiency." Id. This view has already been rejected by the Article 9 Drafting Committee for
commercial transactions. The Drafting Committee did not make a decision with respect to consumer
transactions and, apparently, will let the individual states decide which rule to adopt. Draft section 9-
625(2) states the rebuttable presumption rule for commercial transactions. Feb. 1997 Draft, Art. 9,
supra note 22, § 9-625(2)(B); see infra notes 66-67.
44. See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
45. 2 GILMORE, supra note 2, § 44.6, at 1245.
46. Id.
47. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
48. 2 GILMORE, supra note 2, § 43.2, at 1188-89.
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At a "public sale," it may be hoped, there will be that lively concourse
of bidders which will protect the secured party from his own weakness
and drive the price up to those Himalayan peaks of fair value and true
worth. It may be hoped but the hope will almost certainly be
disappointed. The concourse of bidders at the typical foreclosure sale,
be it ever so "public," is apt to be about as lively as a group of
mourners at a funeral. Nevertheless, the Article 9 draftsmen, who
showed themselves to be imaginative and resourceful in many
situations, were tradition-bound in this one.49
In that context, I am perplexed how Gilmore's analysis of the "really hard
problem," where the secured party bids in for $1000 and resells the collateral
six months later for $10,000, could permit him to make "a reasonable
inference ... that there was no value 5 at the time of the foreclosure sale.
That is clearly wrong; there are ready explanations why bidders do not show
up at Article 9 foreclosure sales even though the collateral does have value.
Two examples will suffice.
First, take the common case where a bank conducts a foreclosure sale of a
used car. Retail consumer buyers are not likely to appear for the simple
reason that they can buy the same model and year car from a dealer, who will
not only provide servicing, but may offer express used car warranties of
condition and performance for a limited period. Financial institutions will not
do so and will even disclaim any possible implied warranties of
merchantability or fitness, even though the Code already acknowledges that
there are no such warranties because such institutions are not usually
"merchants" in the business of selling cars.5' It is plainly unreasonable,
therefore, to infer that the car has no value and to base a deficiency claim on
that inference. The bank will bid in the car and then resell it to a dealer at a
private sale-usually for its wholesale value as adjusted by its present
condition. The dealer will fix up the car and sell it at retail, often for a
profit-which it should be entitled to do.
Second, consider the example of a fifteen-year-old airliner which has been
repossessed by a finance company lender from a bankrupt airline. Assume
that there is an outstanding loan of ten million dollars and the plane requires
one million dollars in repairs. In recent years, the market had been very
49. Id. § 44.6, at 1242.
50. Id. § 44.6, at 1245.
51. See U.C.C. §§ 2-104 cmt. 2 (1995); id. § 2-314.
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limited for some classes of these airplanes, but an expectation existed that
"start-up" airlines would in the near future buy or lease these planes-an
expectation that has in fact been realized. Following repossession, the lender
determined that the plane had a minimum value of four million dollars in its
unrepaired condition. After being unable to find a buyer for a private sale, the
lender held a public sale that procedurally was commercially reasonable. No
bidders appeared and the lender bid in the plane for $100,000. Surely it would
be wrong to infer that the plane had no value, or a value of only $100,000,
and to rely upon that figure in determining a deficiency. At the very least, the
airliner with its four jet engines had a scrap value well in excess of that
amount. Even if the lender had increased its credit bid tenfold to $1,000,000,
that amount would still be unreliable for purposes of accurately calculating a
deficiency.
Point 3 is also wrong. Defaulting debtors often are "not in at least as good
a position as the secured party to promote interest in the sale."52 Debtors fail
and go into default for any number of reasons, including drastic downturns in
personal, financial, or economic conditions which do not necessarily reflect
bad faith by the debtor. Under those circumstances, distressed debtors have
things on their minds other than drumming up interest in a foreclosure sale for
their repossessed property. Moreover, common sense suggests that if these
debtors were in a position to find third party buyers, some might have done so
before going into default, so as to prevent the calling of the loan and
repossession of the collateral. Gilmore's statement to the contrary is
surprisingly naive and unrealistic.
E. Calculating Deficiency Claims
Reiterating what was said earlier,5' in discussing Cases #1 and #2 the issue
is not whether the foreclosure sale and resultant purchase should be upset. If
the sale satisfies the procedural requirements of commercial reasonableness, it
should stand (i.e., be unassailable), and the purchaser, whether it be Third
Party in Case #1 or Bank in Case #2, should be entitled to own the property
free of any claims thereto.54 The critical question here is whether the secured
party may also enforce a deficiency claim based upon the amount of the bid.
For me, the answer is clear in Case #2. Bank should not be able to recover
52. 2 GILMORE, supra note 2, § 44.6, at 1245.
53. See supra note 21, 30 and accompanying text.
54. Id.
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a $65,000 deficiency in Case #2. Case #1, however, is more difficult,
requiring analysis of two separate issues. First, whether Debtor should be able
to even contest the amount of the deficiency claim of $25,000, and, second, if
the challenge can be made, how should it be resolved?
Debtor will, of course, be motivated to challenge the deficiency claim
because of the sale, thirty days later, for $70,000 (i.e., $15,000 more than
Third Party's successful bid of $55,000 at the foreclosure sale). It will
contend that the deficiency is no more than $10,000. On the other hand, Bank
will argue that Debtor should not even be permitted to challenge the
deficiency claim. Indeed, from the perspective of efficiency and limitation of
transaction costs, it is tempting to say that if(i) the procedural requirements of
commercial reasonableness have been satisfied and (ii) the purchaser (Third
Party) at the foreclosure sale was an independent third party, then no
challenge should be allowed in Case #1. That contention and result, based
upon the particular facts in Case #1, certainly has superficial appeal.
The problem with that approach, however, is that it pre-judges the result
and denies Debtor a right to prevent the entry of a judgment against it. What
if Third Party had, instead, purchased the property for $35,000 and Bank was
seeking to enforce a deficiency claim of $45,000? In that circumstance, it
clearly would be unjust to deny Debtor its day in court. Debtor could mount
an effective challenge based upon the following: (i) Bank's pre-foreclosure
evaluation, (ii) the $50,000 upset price, and (iii) the subsequent sale thirty
days later for $70,000. In my view, economic efficiency should, as a general
rule, give way to individual justice and equity, and debtors should not be
denied the right to contest the amount of the deficiency claims asserted
against them, even though many of these contests should and will end on a
motion for summary judgment by the secured party. It is a mistake to assume
that economically efficient rules that shield potentially questionable conduct
from challenge, unless outrageous or egregious, are necessarily helpful to the
business of providing secured credit." The resolution of those challenges,
55. The risk of being challenged has an overall beneficial effect in that it serves as a deterrent to
arrogant behavior and unsound lending practices and procedures. This is not the view of some of the
current revisors to the UCC, who stress having predictable and certain rules that are not susceptible to
judge-made exceptions. For example, consider the uneasy tone of the grudging mini-concession in
Comment 9 to UCC section 9-115. This was only written after comments were received by critics,
including myself, who were concerned that the "protected purchaser" and "control priority" concepts
were too broad and that there needed to be a safety valve against behavior that was aberrant or
otherwise not in good faith because contrary to "reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing"
under UCC section 1-203.
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however, is a different matter.
F. Applying Fair Value
The issue then becomes whether the foreclosure sale price should be
adjusted in calculating the deficiency, viz., the $15,000 credit bid by Bank in
Case #2 and Third Party's bid of $55,000 in Case #1. The goal should be to
accomplish what Gilmore optimistically thought would be achieved with the
commercial reasonableness standard-the realization of fair value. 6 As
evidenced by Case #2, however, that standard does not necessarily
accomplish the goal. To apply the statute in such a way as to allow Bank to
recover a deficiency of $65,000 in Case #2 would be a perversion of that
9. Relation to other law. Section 1-103 provides that "unless displaced by particular provisions of
this Act, the principles of law and equity ... shall supplement its provisions.' There may be
circumstances in which a secured party's action in acquiring a security interest that has priority
under this section constitutes conduct that is wrongful under other law. Though the possibility of
such resort to other law may provide an appropriate "escape valve" for cases of egregious conduct,
care must be taken to ensure that this does not impair the certainty and predictability of the priority
rules. Whether a court may appropriately look to other law to impose liability upon or stop a party
from asserting its Article 9 priority depends on an assessment of the party's conduct under the
standards established by such other law as well as a determination of whether the particular
application of such other law is displaced by the UCC.
In determining whether it is appropriate in a particular case to look to other law, account must
also be taken of the policies that underlie the commercial law rules on securities markets and
security interests in securities. A principal objective of the revision of Article 8 and corresponding
provisions of Article 9 is to ensure that secured financing transactions can be implemented on a
simple, timely, and certain basis. One of the circumstances that led to the revision was the concern
that uncertainty in the application of the rules on secured transactions involving securities and other
financial assets could contribute to systemic risk by impairing the ability of financial institutions to
provide liquidity to the markets in times of stress. The control priority rule is designed to provide a
clear and certain rule to ensure that lenders who have taken the necessary steps to establish control
do not face a risk of subordination to other lenders who have not done so.
The control priority rule does not turn on an inquiry into the state of a party's awareness of
potential conflicting claims because a rule under which a party's rights depended on that sort of
after the fact inquiry could introduce an unacceptable measure of uncertainty. If an inquiry into
awareness could provide a complete and satisfactory resolution of the problem in all cases, the
priority rule of this section would have incorporated that test. The fact that it does not necessarily
means that resort to other law based solely on that factor is precluded, though the question whether
a control secured party induced or encouraged its financing arrangement with actual knowledge
that the debtor would be violating the rights of another secured party may, in some circumstances,
appropriately be treated as a factor in determining whether the control party's action is the kind of
egregious conduct for which resort to other law is appropriate.
U.C.C. § 9-115 cmt. 9 (1995). Professor Mooney contributed substantially to this Comment.
56. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
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objective. Moreover, application of the standard of commercial
reasonableness is much too problematic, even more so than fair value.
Disputes about the commercial reasonableness of the procedures followed by
the secured party have turned out to be one of the most litigated issues under
the Code.
Accordingly, it makes sense to go to the heart of the issue and amend
Article 9 to straightforwardly require that there be fair value. As previously
indicated, the fair value rule is the majority rule for deficiency actions in real
estate mortgage law" and was the rule in some states for personal property
secured transactions prior to the enactment of Article 9.59 The essence of the
rule is basic justice and fairness--"the broad equitable concept that a
mortgagee is not entitled to recover more than the full amount of the
mortgage debt."'6 One should be hard-pressed to quarrel with that
proposition.
The fair value rule is not necessarily synonymous with "fair market value"
because fair value recognizes that foreclosure sales are usually under distress
conditions and made in a forced sale marketplace. Moreover, there does not
have to be one certain value, but, instead, a range of values, and a credit
against the outstanding obligation of an amount within that range fulfills the
equitable concept inherent in fair value. It is a quest for fairness and
reasonableness, not certainty. The adage that the "best settlement is one where
neither party is happy with the result" is useful here. Phrases such as "fair
foreclosure value" or "reasonable foreclosure value" could just as easily be
used because they carry the same connotation and implement the same
concept. A helpful analogy in a related area is the change from "fair
consideration" to "reasonably equivalent value" in the fraudulent conveyance
and transfer laws.6' Let us examine how fair value would be determined in
Cases #1 and #2.
The initial inquiry concerns the $70,000 resale to Fourth Party thirty days
after the foreclosure sale. The resale is certainly an evidentiary factor in
determining value, but should not be conclusive. We do not know whether
57. Robert M. Lloyd, The Absolute Bar Rule in UCC Foreclosure Sales: A Prescription for
Waste, 40 UCLA L. REV. 695, 699 n.22 (1993).
58. RESTATEMENT OF MORTGAGES, supra note 14, § 8.4.
59. See examples cited supra note 15.
60. 79-83 Thirteenth Ave., Ltd. v. De Marco, 210 A.2d 401,406 (N.J. 1965).
61. Compare UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT §§ 3-4 (1918), 7A U.L.A. 427, 44849,474
(1985), with UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT §§ 4-5 (1984), 7A U.L.A. 639, 652-53, 657 (1985).
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there were any repairs or improvements to the collateral in that period or the
cost of any that may have been made. In Case #1, Third Party may have had
more marketing capability than Bank, e.g., it may have been a merchant or
dealer. Nor do we know anything about the marketplace conditions in which
Third Party was selling other than that the conditions were probably not as
distressed as the foreclosure sale. If Third Party was a dealer, the sale could
be to a retail market. Even if not a dealer, Third Party might still be in a
position to make a profit on a resale. There should be no impediment-legal,
policy, moral or ethical-to Third Party making a profit on the resale. We
also need to know something about Fourth Party and whether there were any
special circumstances which might explain the $70,000 price.
In contrast, the $70,000 resale price in Case #2 would be a weightier
factor because it raises the immediate question of why Bank did not, or was
not able to, negotiate a private foreclosure sale to Fourth Party thirty days
earlier.62 Bank may well have had a reasonable explanation which it should
be allowed to give. The fact that the $70,000 resale price exceeded the pre-
foreclosure valuation range of $50,000 to $60,000 is another factor to be
considered in determining fair value. But, there also needs to be information
on how that range was determined and the reliability of that determination. In
that connection, Bank established its let go price conservatively at the low
end of that range. Generally, that should not be viewed as an unreasonable
decision on Bank's part.
Obviously, the range and let go price are critical factors in Case #2 in
contrast to Bank's credit bid of $15,000. There needs to be an explanation of
the basis for that bid. It seems almost certain that the $15,000 bid should be
adjusted upwards. Unless the Bank can establish that the $50,000 to $60,000
range was mistaken or excessive, the upward adjustment should be to at least
an amount that falls within that range. If the $50,000 let go price was
reasonable, that amount could be used, thereby resulting in a deficiency of
$30,000. Absent a satisfactory explanation of why the Bank could not have
made that sale thirty days earlier, there could even be a higher adjustment to
the $70,000 resale price, reducing the deficiency to $10,000.
The circumstances of Case #1 call for a different analysis which could
well lead to a different result. There, Bank let the property go to Third Party
for $55,000. If Third Party was truly an independent party, the sale for that
62. Private foreclosure sales to parties with whom the secured party has a relationship should
also be subject to the fair value rule. See supra note 22.
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price lends great credence to the $50,000 to $60,000 valuation range and the
$50,000 let go price. This factor weighs heavily in Bank's favor and,
notwithstanding the $70,000 resale price, militates against penalizing Bank by
a reduction of the $25,000 deficiency claim. Even if, as in Case #2, the
$70,000 price paid by Fourth Party actually represents the fair market value
of the property, the $55,000 amount of the foreclosure sale price paid by
Third Party constitutes almost eighty percent of that fair market value and
could be justified as the fair value, fair foreclosure value, or reasonable
foreclosure value for purposes of calculating the deficiency.63 Thus, there
would be no adjustment and the deficiency would remain at $25,000. This
could be determined on a motion for summary judgment.
G. The Fair Value Proposal
When I first advanced the fair value proposal in connection with the
pending revision of Article 9, I took the position that it should be applicable
to all deficiency claims, whether consumer or commercial. Borrowing from
the fair value deficiency statutes in effect in numerous jurisdictions governing
real estate mortgage deficiency actions,' I suggested that UCC section 9-504
be amended to require a credit in calculating deficiency claims:
63. To reiterate, fair value can be different than fair market value. See supra note 61 and
accompanying text. This is similhr to the approach followed by some courts in determining whether a
transfer was fraudulent under section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code for failure to satisfy the reasonably
equivalent value requirement. E.g., Bundles v. Baker, 856 F.2d 815, 824 (7th Cir. 1988) (reasonable
equivalence should be determined on a case-by-case basis that starts with fair market value but accords
"respect" to the foreclosure sale proceedings); Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201,203
(5th Cir. 1980) (suggesting mechanical application of the threshold requirement that the transfer bring
at least 70% of the market value of the property). These cases were, of course, subsequently rejected
by the 5-4 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 114 S.
Ct. 1757 (1994), which held that reasonably equivalent value is conclusively established by the price
paid at a noncollusive, lawfully conducted, and procedurally complying real estate mortgage
foreclosure sale. As of the writing of this Article it is not clear whether the decision is applicable to an
Article 9 foreclosure sale. In any event, I believe that Justice Souter's dissent was better reasoned and
more realistic and that much of its reasoning can and should be applied to the issue at hand:
[The Durrett "rule".. .claims only to be a description of what foreclosure prices have, in practice,
been found "reasonable[e]," and as such, it is consistent... with the textual directive that one value
be compared to another ... To the extent, moreover, that Durrett is said to have announced a
"rule," it is better understood as recognizing a "safe harbor" or affirmative defense for bidding
mortgagees or other transferees who paid 70% or more of a property's appraised value at the time
of sale.
Id. at 1773 n.13.
64. RESTATEMENT OF MORTGAGES, supra note 14, § 8.4.
[VOL. 74:491
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol75/iss1/13
1997] DEFICIENT TREATMENT OF DEFICIENCY CLAIMS 511
The existence and amount of a deficiency shall be determined by
allowing a credit against the indebtedness of an amount equal to what
would have been realized from a sale or disposition that was conducted
in a commercially reasonable manner (subsection (2) of Section 9-
507), irrespective of whether the actual sale or disposition was so
conducted and irrespective of the price obtained.6"
The phrase "would have been realized from a sale or disposition that was
conducted in a commercially reasonable manner" was borrowed directly from
the Reporters' formulation of the "rebuttable presumption rule" in Draft
section 9-625.' That provision limits a debtor's liability when the foreclosure
conducted by the secured party has not complied with the procedural
requirements of commercial reasonableness. The rule is that noncompliance
results in the secured party being unable to enforce a deficiency claim unless
it can sustain the burden of factually proving that what "would have been
realized" from a complying sale would still have been less than the amount of
the outstanding obligation.67 Application of that rule necessarily involves a
determination of the value of the collateral at the time of the foreclosure sale
or disposition. In my view, that determination involves essentially the same
65. Rapson, supra note 11, at 686-87.
66. Feb. 1997 Draft, Art. 9, supra note 22, § 9-625(2). Here, the issue is whether a secured party
who has not satisfied the commercial reasonableness requirements in conducting a foreclosure sale can
still enforce a deficiency claim. In contrast to the absolute bar rule which precludes such a claim, the
rebuttable presumption rule allows the secured party to enforce such a claim if and to the extent it can
sustain the burden of proving that the value of the collateral was, in fact, less than the amount of the
outstanding debt. The formulation in February 1997 Draft, section 9-625 provides:
In an action in which the amount of a deficiency or surplus is in issue the following rules apply:
(2) ... the liability of a debtor or a secondary obligor for a deficiency is limited to an amount
by which the sum of the secured obligation, expenses, and attorney's fees exceeds the greater of the
[actual] proceeds of the collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance or the amount of
proceeds that would have been realized had the noncomplying secured party proceeded in
accordance with [Section 9-607, 9-608, 9-609, 9-610, 9-611, 9-612, 9-613, or 9-614] [the
provisions of this part relating to collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance]. However, the
amount that would have been realized is equal to the sum of the secured obligation, expenses, and
attorney's fees unless the secured party meets the burden of establishing that the amount is less than
that sum.
Id. (brackets in original). Both Alternative A (which contains a separate absolute bar rule for consumer
secured transactions) and Alternative B (which provides a rebuttable presumption rule for all
transactions) read the same on this point.
67. Id. This is in sharp contrast to the absolute bar rule which Gilmore concluded was the
consequence of noncompliance--and which has been rejected by the Article 9 Drafting Committee at
least for commercial transactions. See supra note 43.
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elements of proof required to determine fair value. It is the reverse side of the
same coin-in both instances the secured party is required to sustain the
burden of establishing value in order to recover a deficiency.
The proposal was formulated in those terms because it was conceptually
consistent with the rebuttable presumption rule which had already been
approved by the Article 9 Drafting Committee. Inasmuch as the Drafting
Committee was prepared to adopt a rule which, as a practical matter, required
a determination of fair value by a fact-finder, why not use that concept
whenever the secured party sought to enforce a deficiency claim and obviate
the need to litigate commercial reasonableness? The rebuttable presumption
rule is applicable to the circumstance where there is non-compliance with the
requirements for commercial reasonableness; the proposal I advanced made
commercial reasonableness irrelevant for purposes of enforcing a right to
recover a deficiency and the calculation thereof. There would, nevertheless,
still be sanctions, albeit different, for non-compliance.68
II. THE DELIBERATIONS OF THE ARTICLE 9 DRAFTING COMMITTEE
The initial reaction of the Drafting Committee was not favorable.69 The
Reporters and most members were concerned that too many deficiency
claims would be contested and result in "valuation hearings." For the most
part, there was a willingness to accept the view that if the procedural
requirements of commercial reasonableness were satisfied, the amount of the
bid, no matter by whom or how low, conclusively established the
deficiency.7" A few members, however, were willing to consider a fair value
rule where the secured party had bid in the property with a nominal or
68. In essence, the secured party would be liable for damages resulting from non-compliance.
UCC Draft section 9-624(b) provides:
A secured party is liable for damages in the amount of any loss caused by a failure to comply
with this article. Except as otherwise provided in Section 9-627, a person that, at the time of the
failure, was a debtor, was a secondary obligor, or held a security interest in or other lien on the
collateral has a right to recover damages for its loss under this subsection. A debtor whose
deficiency is eliminated under Section 9-625 may recover damages for the loss of any surplus, but a
debtor or consumer obligor whose deficiency is eliminated or reduced under Section 9-625 may not
otherwise recover under this subsection for noncompliance with [Section 9-607, 9-608, 9-609, 9-
610, 9-611, 9-612, 9-613, or 9-614] [the provisions of this part relating to collection, enforcement,
disposition, or acceptance].
Feb. 1997 Draft, Art. 9, supra note 22, § 9-624 (brackets in original).
69. See infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text
70. In other words, Bank would be entitled to recover a $65,000 deficiency claim in Case #2
which Debtor could not successfully challenge. See supra note 22.
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disproportionately low bid.7'
At this point, it is useful to retrace and follow in greater detail the path of
the fair value proposal made to the Article 9 Drafting Committee to see where
it may lead.
A. The Permanent Editorial Board Study Committee
The proposed revision of Article 9 commenced in 1990 with the establish-
ment of a Study Committee of the Permanent Editorial Board for the UCC
charged with recommending whether Article 9 and related provisions of the
UCC were in need of revision. The Study Committee met seven times from
1990 to 1992 and issued a Report in December 1992 which made wide-
ranging recommendations for revision.72
Although the Study Committee Report deals extensively with the subject
of enforcement and contains important recommendations affecting the default
provisions in Part 5 of Article 9, the calculation of deficiency actions and the
fair value proposal are never discussed. Indeed, that topic was never on the
agenda for the Study Committee and never mentioned in the meetings. No
one else brought up the issue, and I did not realize that I would have to make
it an issue until it was too late to bring it before the Study Committee. My
article discussing deficiency actions and advancing the fair value proposal73
did not appear until late 1992, after the Study Committee's last meeting. I did,
however, indicate to the Reporters for the Study Committee (who became the
Reporters for the Drafting Committee) that I intended to raise the issue in the
Drafting Committee. Accordingly, the Study Committee Report, in
recommending adoption of the rebuttable presumption rule as Article 9's
baseline rule, contained the following footnote:
The statement in the text assumes that deficiencies will continue to be
determined by deducting from the secured debt an amount equal to the
net proceeds of a disposition that complies with Part 5. See § 9-504(1),
71. In response to the criticism that the language of my proposed formulation might not be
effective in that circumstance because what "would have been realized" from a commercially
reasonable sale was exactly that same nominal or low bid, addition of the following sentence would
resolve that "problem": "In making that determination, it shall be assumed that the sale or disposition
was to a purchaser other than the (i) secured party or (ii) an affiliate or insider of the secured party."
72. PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB STUDY GROUP
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9 REPORT (Dec. 1, 1992) [hereinafter STUDY COMMITTEE
REPORT].
73. Rapson, supra note 11.
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(2). The Committee did not consider whether to change the means by
which a deficiency is determined; the Drafting Committee may wish to
do so. 4
Why was this issue not considered by the Study Committee? In retrospect,
notwithstanding the excellence and expertise of the Reporters and the other
Study Committee members, none were consumer advocates or had extensive
litigation background on behalf of consumers or business debtors where the
issue arises most frequently. As a consequence, the principal focus of the
Study Committee was on business credit transactions:
Perceived problems relating to business credit transactions were the
principal impetus for the Committee's study, and its recommendations
reflect these concerns. However, the Committee believes that
much work remains to be done to evaluate the Committee's
recommendations from the consumer-protection perspective and to
identify additional consumer protection issues related to secured credit.
Efforts are under way to organize a task force to pursue these projects.
The Committee recognizes that revision of Article 9 might or might
not be the appropriate method of addressing a particular law reform in
this context.7'
Although I have been a commercial litigator and handled numerous
deficiency actions, most of that experience was in New Jersey and New York
where courts apply the fair value rule. 6 I did not learn that it was not the rule
in other states or that some of my colleagues on the Study Committee
opposed the concept until after I wrote the Idaho Law Review article.77
Unfortunately, by then it was too late for the Study Committee to consider the
issue. It would have to be brought before the Drafting Committee.
B. The Drafting Committee in 1993 and 1994: Opposition
In early 1993, the Article 9 Drafting Committee held an organizational
meeting at which it was decided to deal initially with enforcement upon
default under the Part 5 provisions. During that meeting, I urged that the
calculation of deficiencies, including the fair value proposal, be considered.
74. STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 72, at 201 n.7.
75. Id. at 3 n.9.
76. See examples cited supra note 16.
77. Rapson, supra note 11.
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At first, that suggestion received no support from the Reporters or the other
Drafting Committee members-but, fortunately, one member, Dale Higer,
spoke up and said: "I'd like to hear more about that proposal." Mr. Higer, an
experienced real estate attorney in Idaho, was already familiar with the fair
value rule in the real estate mortgage context." His willingness to consider
the issue was an important development.
To its credit, the Drafting Committee then proceeded to extensively
consider the issue. Consumer advocates regularly attended the meetings and
vigorously recounted their problems with the enforcement of deficiency
claims and described perceived abuses. Although they had their own agenda
and recommendations for dealing with the issue,79 they expressed general
support for the fair value approach. As a result, the issue was thoroughly
discussed and debated at meetings in 1993 and 1994. The report of the March
5-7, 1994 meeting made by the advisor to the Drafting Committee from the
American Bar Association Section of Business Law reflected the continued
negative reaction of most of the Drafting Committee:
Measurement of Deficiency Claim. The persons present considered at
length the important question of how to measure the deficiency that a
secured party may recover after it has conducted a complying
disposition under UCC § 9-504. The draft provides that the secured
party is entitled to a deficiency equal to the excess of its secured
obligation over the actual proceeds of the disposition. The discussion
considered whether the secured party's deficiency claim should be
limited to the difference between its secured obligation and the "fair
value" of the collateral, at least where the secured party purchases at
the sale. After extended discussion, the position of the draft was
upheld."0
Although the Drafting Committee was largely opposed to a general rule
requiring a fair value determination in deficiency claims, a minority was more
supportive of the concept in the limited context "where the secured party
78. See IDAHO CODE § 6-108 (1990) (uses "reasonable value").
79. E.g., Gail Hillebrand, The Redrafting of UCC Articles 2 and 9: Model Codes or Model
Dinosaurs?, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 191, 201-11 (1994); Gail Hillebrand, The Uniform Commercial
Code Drafting Process: Will Articles 2, 2B and 9 Be Fair to Consumers?, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 69, 133-
39 (1997); David M. McMahon, Commercially Reasonable Sales and Deficiency Judgments Under
U.C.C. Article 9: An Analysis of Revision Proposals, 48 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 64 (1994).
80. Steven 0. Weise, Report: Second Meeting of Article 9 Drafting Committee, 1994 A.B.A.
SEC. BUS. L. REP. 1, 3 (footnote omitted) (on file with the Washington University Law Quarterly).
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purchases at the sale," i.e., Case #2."' In addition, there was some recognition
that a special rule might be appropriate in consumer cases.
C. The Drafting Committee in 1995 and 1996: Progress
In the meeting of June 9-11, 1995, the issue again came up, primarily
because of a letter from Professor Luize Zubrow summarizing an article in
which she recommended that a foreclosing creditor have a fiduciary duty to
the debtor "to maximize collateral disposition revenue for the benefit of the
debtor." 2 Interestingly, no mention was made of Professor Gilmore's view
that the commercial reasonableness standard was already the conceptual
equivalent of a fiduciary obligation. 3 The meeting also discussed my
proposal that fair value should at least be applicable to the circumstance
where the secured party bids in for a nominal value. The report of the ABA
advisor reflected that the Drafting Committee, although opposed to the
fiduciary duty idea, significantly moderated its prior opposition to the fair
value concept and made a decision to deal meaningfully with the issue:
Fiduciary Duties? The materials included a submission to the
Reporters and the Drafting Committee suggesting that Article 9 should
state that a secured party owes a fiduciary duty to the debtor in
connection with foreclosure sales.
This arises out of a concern that a secured party might not have
sufficient incentive under existing rules to seek to obtain the best
possible price at a foreclosure sale. This might occur where the
collateral has a value significantly in excess of the amount owed.
There was general agreement that the secured party should not have
a fiduciary duty to the debtor in this context and that the principal
problem, in non-consumer transactions, related to foreclosure sales to
the secured party. There was agreement that any "solution" should
81. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
82. Letter from Prof. Luize E. Zubrow, George Wash. Univ., Nat'l Law Ctr., to Prof. Charles w.
Mooney, Jr., Univ. of Penn. Law Sch. (Mar. 21, 1995) (on file with the Washington University Law
Quarterly) (presenting the ideas in Luize E. Zubrow, Rethinking Article 9 Remedies: Economic and
Fiduciary Perspectives, 42 UCLA L. REV. 445 (1994)). The fact that neither Professor Zubrow, me,
nor anyone else on the Drafting Committee mentioned Gilmore's view that commercial reasonableness
imposed a duty akin to that of a fiduciary, supports the conclusion that his optimism about what would
be accomplished under that standard has not come to fruition.
83. 2 GILMORE, supra note 2, § 44.5, at 1232-34; supra note 41.
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address this problem with "special treatment" without imposing a
"fiduciary" structure.
The Drafting Committee agreed by a wide margin to ask the
Reporters to explore language affecting the calculation of deficiencies
when the secured party buys the collateral.(63)
(63) The materials contained *exchanges of letters and memos
reporting on an ongoing dialogue on how to calculate a deficiency
following a complying sale. This concern was dealt with in this
vote for further study.84
That request made to the Reporters in June 1995 was not immediately
acted upon. This was primarily because of developments which took place the
following month at the Annual Meeting of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. A general question arose concerning
the extent to which the UCC should contain special provisions dealing with
consumer issues. As a result, consumer subcommittees were appointed to
make recommendations on this critical issue to the Drafting Committees then
working on the revisions of Articles 2 and 9, respectively. The Article 9
subcommittee was chaired by Professor Marion Benfield."5 Inasmuch as the
subject of deficiency claims was one of the major issues to be confronted by
this subcommittee, the Reporters understandably decided to await its report
before implementing the June 1995 request of the Drafting Committee.
In May 1996, the Benfield Subcommittee submitted its report. It deals
extensively with the deficiency claim issue, stating in pertinent part as
follows:
... 3) Deficiency after foreclosure sale purchase by 1) secured party,
2) party against whom secured party has recourse, or 3) party related to
the secured party.
Consumer representatives are concerned that a purchase by any of
the parties described above will not be at a price which reflects the
84. Steven 0. Weise, UCC Article 9 Revisions: Report on June '95 Meeting of Drafting
Committee, 1995 A.B.A. SEC. BUS. L. REP. 1, 15 (on file with the Washington University Law
Quarterly).
85. Professor Benfield is a member of the Permanent Editorial Board for the UCC and the faculty
of Wake Forest University School of Law. The other members of this Subcommittee ("the Benfield
Subcommittee") included Henry M. Kittleson, Esq. of Lakeland, Florida; Sandra Stem, Esq. of New
York City; and Professor Neil Cohen of the Brooklyn Law School.
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reasonable foreclosure value of the collateral ... If the secured party, a
person who is liable to the secured party for the unpaid debt ("recourse
party"), or a person who is under substantial common ownership with
the secured party ("related party") can buy at the foreclosure sale, there
is a positive incentive for them to buy at below the fair foreclosure
value of the collateral. In all three cases, the actual "price" paid at the
foreclosure sale is economically irrelevant to them except as it fixes the
amount of deficiency. The lower the foreclosure sales price paid, the
larger the deficiency which may be recovered from the debtor. And
there is an opportunity for the secured party, recourse party, or related
party to sell the collateral at a price which nets them more, sometimes
substantially more, than the price they bid at the foreclosure sale.
Various consumer representatives have made different suggestions
regarding how the possibilities for abuse might be dealt with in the
statute. Among those suggestions have been: (1) deny the secured
party the right to buy at its own foreclosure sale, or deny a right to
deficiency if it does buy; (2) retain the present 9-504(5) rule under
which, it is assumed, a sale to a recourse party cannot be an Article 9
sale fixing the deficiency; (3) subject sales to the secured party,
recourse party, or related party to special scrutiny if a deficiency is
sought based on the price received at the foreclosure sale...
Alternatives:
Since three different situations are involved which present Article 9
treats differently, the possible alternatives are somewhat complicated.
(a) prohibit any of the three parties from buying at the foreclosure
sale
(b) prohibit any of the three parties from buying at private sales, but
permit them to buy at public sales
(c) retain the rules of Present Article 9, with the result that transfers
(sales) to recourse parties are not Article 9 foreclosure sales, secured
parties can by [sic] at public sales, and related parties are ... able to
buy at private foreclosure sales except to the extent that a court may
treat a related party as being the same as the secured party.
(d) Subject to special higher scrutiny the price received and other
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aspects of the foreclosure sale if the purchaser at the sale is the secured
party, a recourse party, or a related party. Under this alternative, the
Drafting Committee should decide whether any of the parties can
purchase at a private sale.
Subcommittee recommendation:
Adopt alternative d and direct the reporters to draft a
provision subjecting such sales to special scrutiny as stated in the
4th alternative. In drafting the reporters should consider the
discussion in this memorandum on the issue, but should not be
limited to the solutions mentioned as possibilities in that
discussion.
Reason: Despite the incentives to a secured party to buy at below
reasonable foreclosure value, Present and Committee Draft Article 9
permit the secured party itself to buy at its own public foreclosure sale,
but not at its own private sale. The underlying assumption of that rule
is that the requirement of publicity and ... [the other] requirements of
a commercially reasonable public sale (reasonable time and place[]
etc.) provide protection against a purchase by the secured party at less
than reasonable foreclosure value. We reject the idea that the secured
party should be prohibited from buying at its own public sale. We
doubt that there is any assurance that imposing restrictions on the
creditor's ability to buy will increase the price received on foreclosure
in the normal case. It is true that creditors often buy at the foreclosure
sale and it is also true that foreclosure sales often bring prices which
are disappointingly low. The Code's requirement that the sale be
commercially reasonable is intended to secure a reasonable price at
foreclosure. We believe that the commercially reasonable requirement
is a great improvement over the older statutes which specified the
details of the sale, and we also believe that having the creditor as an
available bidder at a public sale increases the number of buyers by one
and that is a good thing. Abuses of that right are better dealt with by an
attack on the sale as proposed in Subcommittee alternative 4....
A third possible way to protect against inflated deficiencies if the
secured party, a recourse party, or related party buys at the foreclosure
sale, is to subject to higher than usual scrutiny the price received and
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other aspects of the sale. For example, the secured party might be able
to measure the deficiency by the price received only if a special
showing is made that actual bona fide offers were received from
unrelated prospective buyers, or that bona fide efforts to secure fair
foreclosure value at the foreclosure sale were made. Under such a rule,
if the secured party does not meet the higher standard of proof as to the
reasonableness of the price received, or as to the efforts made in the
sale to secure a reasonable price, the secured party, even though it had
a commercially reasonable sale, would not be able to use the sale price
to measure the deficiency.
It is perhaps relevant to the Drafting Committee thinking on the
issues involved here that The Restatement of the Law of Property,
(Mortgages), Tentative Draft No. 5, Section 8.4, (approved by the
American Law Institute this May) provides that in all actions for
deficiency after a real estate mortgage foreclosure, the debtor may
request that the fair market value of the collateral as of the date of
foreclosure be determined. If such a request is made, any deficiency is
based on the difference between the debt and the fair market value. But
if no request is made for that determination, the deficiency is the
difference between the foreclosure sales price and the debt. That rule is
supported by statutory or judge made law in about half the states which
apply to some or all real estate mortgage foreclosures.
Application of a fair market value test for deficiency recovery in all
Article 9 transactions, even all consumer transactions, is probably not
justified. Deficiency claims are likely to be smaller in consumer
personal property transactions. Further, the Article 9 requirement that
foreclosure sales be commercially reasonable protects against
unreasonably low foreclosure sale prices. In contrast, the typical real
estate foreclosure statute imposes judgment-sale-like procedures on
real estate foreclosures which make it very unlikely that the real estate
will bring a reasonable market price. Also, in real estate transactions it
is much more likely that the mortgagee will bid in at the sale.
However, in consumer secured transactions in which the secured
party, a recourse party, or a related party, buys at the foreclosure sale, it
may be reasonable to require the person suing for a deficiency, on
demand of the debtor, to make a special showing as to the
reasonableness of the price received. In the absence of that proof,
[VCOL. 74:491
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reasonable foreclosure value of the collateral might be the basis on
which to determine the amount of the deficiency.
The Subcommittee has not fully considered possible methods, other
than... those mentioned here, by which to protect against self-dealing
in the three situations discussed here. Therefore, our recommendation
is that the reporters be instructed to prepare provisions that subject to
higher than usual scrutiny the price paid by a secured party, recourse
party, or related party, and other aspects of any foreclosure sale in
which those parties buy the collateral. In preparing those provisions,
the reporters are not limited to the suggestions made here.
The Subcommittee has described "related parties" as those who are
in a common ownership relation with the secured party. Consumer
groups have described the "related party" category more broadly to
include parties with whom the secured party has regular business
dealings. The Subcommittee hesitates to extend the concept beyond
common ownership because of the uncertainty created.
The Subcommittee has also used the phrase "reasonable foreclosure
value" rather than fair market value or reasonable market value. We
have done so in recognition of the fact that in the circumstances of
most foreclosure sales, few buyers will pay the same price they would
pay in the non-foreclosure situation. Therefore, the relevant value is
not "market" value, but "foreclosure" value... 86
This recommendation, along with several other recommendations of the
Benfield Subcommittee, was approved unanimously by the Drafting
Committee at its June 6-9, 1996 meeting. The Reporters then requested that
Drafting Committee members submit suggested statutory formulations
implementing this recommendation. I immediately responded to this request.
Although the recommendation approved by the Drafting Committee in
June 1996 was with respect to deficiency claims against consumers, the
substance of that recommendation was much the same as the request made to
the Reporters in June 1995 which extended to commercial transactions. 7 The
Drafting Committee had again acknowledged that there was a problem which
86. Memorandum from Article 9 Drafting Committee, Consumer Issues Subcommittee to Article
9 Drafting Committee, Advisors, and Observers 7-11 (May 29, 1996) (on file with the Washington
University Law Quarterly), reprinted in 50 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 332 (1996) (slightly reformatted
for publication).
87. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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needed to be rectified and that it wanted a special rule for the calculation of
deficiency claims where the secured party, or one with whom it had a
"relationship," was the purchaser at the foreclosure sale. Accordingly, the
proposal which I submitted made no distinction between commercial and
consumer transactions:
Proposed Section 9-50x [9-62x]
(a) Subject to subsection (b), in enforcing a claim to recover a
deficiency (Sections 9-502(e)(3), 9-504(d) and 9-505 [9-608(a)(4), 9-
614(d) and 9-620]), the deficiency shall be calculated on the basis of
(i) any cash proceeds of collection or enforcement received in
compliance with Section 9-502, (ii) any acceptance of collateral in
partial satisfaction of the obligation made in compliance with Section
9-505, and (iii) the price paid upon any disposition of collateral made
in compliance with Section 9-504.
(b) If the purchaser at a disposition of collateral made in compliance
with Section 9-504 is the (i) secured party, (ii) an affiliate or insider of
the secured party, (iii) a person liable to the secured party under a
guaranty, indorsement, repurchase agreement, or the like, or (iv) a
person other than those mentioned in (i), (ii) or (iii) but the remaining
balance of the obligation is satisfied by a person mentioned in (iii), the
calculation of the deficiency shall be made by adjusting the price paid
for the collateral to the extent necessary to approximate a fair
foreclosure value of the collateral at the time of disposition. "Fair
foreclosure value" shall be determined by considering among other
things, (1) the actual condition of the collateral, (2) appraisals,
evaluations, surveys and the like of the collateral, (3) guidebooks
setting forth values of the kind or type of collateral at the time of
disposition, (4) estimates of value or ranges of value, if any, made or
obtained by the secured party in establishing the minimum acceptable
purchase price from a purchaser who is not an affiliate or insider, (5)
prices paid at any subsequent dispositions of the collateral by the
purchaser, taking into consideration the proximity of the time of such
dispositions to the initial disposition and any costs incurred by the
purchaser in protecting, marketing, repairing or improving the
collateral, (6) prices paid at comparable dispositions of the kind or type
of collateral, (7) whether the purchaser is in the business of selling the
kind or type of collateral, and (8) market practices and conditions for
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dispositions of the kind or type of collateral at the time and place of the
disposition of the collateral."8
This proposal was based upon my own experiences in private practice
handling deficiency actions for numerous secured parties and conversations
with business people at CIT who handle Article 9 foreclosure sales and
deficiency actions. These people have indicated to me that the proposal
essentially reflects their practices and procedures.
It should be noted that this provision for the adjustment of the foreclosure
sale price in calculating the amount of the deficiency is mandatory and is not
conditioned upon a demand or request by the debtor. Most deficiency actions
result in a default judgment against the debtor89 and are based upon sworn
affidavits of proof made by the secured party, which are filed with the court
and set forth the manner in which the deficiency was calculated. Requiring
the secured party to spell out the details in a sworn statement with sanctions
for false statements should significantly deter the practice of calculating
deficiencies on the basis of nominal or disproportionately low bids.
The Reporters did not respond directly to this proposal. Instead, they
submitted a memorandum entitled "Alternative Approaches Toward Low-
Price Foreclosure Sales to the Secured Party or a Related Party."9 This
memorandum set forth and briefly discussed five alternative approaches to
dealing with the issue. In doing so, the Reporters characterized the problem as
one of "self-dealing" and offered several approaches based on the "fiduciary
88. Memorandum from Donald J. Rapson to Prof. Marion Benfield et al. (June 11, 1996) (on file
with author) (together with Proposed Section 9-50x revised as of August 8, 1996 to reflect comments
from other persons). During the writing of this Article, category (iv) was added to the proposal as a
result of a telephone conversation with David M. McMahon of Mountain State Justice, Inc. (W. Va.),
the West Virginia Legal Services Plan, discussing this particular factual circumstance and the potential
problem. See supra note 79; infra note 133. The section numbers in brackets refer to the February
1997 Draft of the proposed revision.
89. Creditors often enter default judgments against the debtors without attempting to enforce the
judgments at the time of entry. The judgments remain of record for many years and accrue interest.
Years later, the judgment defendant may be seeking a loan or other extension of credit from a
prospective lender, e.g., a mortgage to buy a home. The judgment defendant may then be required to
pay off this "old" judgment, including accrued interest, in order to obtain that loan or credit extension.
There is nothing improper about this creditor practice. It does, however point out the need for fair rules
in the enforcement of deficiency claims and the need to protect against excessive deficiency
judgments.
90. Memorandum from Prof. Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Reporters to Article 9
Drafting Committee (July 30, 1996) (attached hereto in Appendix 1). The Reporters apparently did not
feel the need to repeat or restate at length the substance of the various materials presented to, and
discussions had by, the Drafting Committee in the previous three and one-half years.
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obligation" concept.9
Although the memorandum did not endorse any of the other alternatives,
its Alternative 2, which purported to cover the fair value concept, was given
short shrift by the Reporters, reflecting their continued opposition:
Alternative 2: Base deficiency calculation on "value" of
collateral in self-dealing dispositions.
For reasons explained in detail at previous meetings, we are not
inclined to support Alternative 2 unless, perhaps, all other approaches
fail. Valuation, especially the valuation of personal property on
foreclosure, is inherently problematic.92
I was greatly disappointed with this memorandum and immediately
responded in detail,93 stating that the Reporters in abruptly dismissing
Alternative 2 "may be making resolution of the Drafting Committee's request
more difficult than need be"; were "being overly resistant to the [fair value]
concept and not recognizing that this is what many secured lenders routinely
do in actual practice"; and "use of the phrase 'self-dealing' clouds the issue"
in suggesting that the "secured party or related parties are somehow acting
improperly when they 'buy-in' at the foreclosure sale."94 I also stated that
"[s]elf-dealing is not the issue-calculation of the deficiency is the problem";
"the Reporters are exaggerating the difficulty of making valuations" and
"being conceptually inconsistent" with their own formulation of the
rebuttable presumption rule.95 Finally, I concluded that the fair value proposal
"provides a straightforward resolution of the issue, follows a traditional
approach and reflects actual and good business practices."96
Subsequently, the Reporters submitted a new memorandum setting forth a
revised set of alternatives, in which they deleted those articulating the
fiduciary obligation concept and added three new alternatives, stating:
As things stand, there remains a division among the Drafting
Committee and others from whom we have heard. Some favor moving
to a value-based rule, others favor the status quo, and others favor
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2.
93. Memorandum from Donald J. Rapson to Article 9 Drafting Committee (Aug. 8, 1996)
(attached hereto in Appendix 2 without its attachments).
94. Id. at 1.
95. Id. at 1-3.
96. Id. at 4.
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additional alternatives. We have received no broad support for using a
fiduciary standard, although we have received some very strong
opposition to that approach. We also received little support for
enhanced advertising and notification requirements.
A revised set of alternatives follows. Alternatives 1, 2, and 3
remain unchanged. Alternatives 4 and 5 from our July memorandum
have been deleted. We have added three new alternatives (4, 5, and 6).
Each of these new alternatives might avoid the need to test self-dealing
(and similar) transactions under a special standard. 97
These new alternatives all involve a determination of value in the
calculation of a deficiency:
Alternative 4: Adopt a standard for self-dealing dispositions
under which a disposition yielding proceeds less than the
reasonably equivalent value would not be in compliance. The
reasonably equivalent value, then, would be used to establish the
deficiency.
Alternative 4 contemplates the use of "reasonably equivalent value"
as interpreted under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act and
Bankruptcy Code § 548. In effect, if the disposition would have been
avoidable under the (pre-BFP) Durrett line of cases, it would not
comply with Article 9.
Alternative 5: Provide explicitly in the statute that the "price"
received in a disposition is a "term" of a disposition that must be
commercially reasonable.
The Drafting Committee has not discussed this approach in some
time. When last addressed, the Committee members were divided.
This approach would avoid some of the difficulties of requiring a
valuation for every deficiency claim while providing that an
unreasonably low price cannot be the basis of the deficiency
calculation.
97. Memorandum from Profs. Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Reporters to Article 9
Drafting Committee, Advisors, and Observers 1 (Oct. 10, 1996) (attached hereto in Appendix 3
without its attachments).
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Alternative 6: Adopt a permissible procedure for calculating a
deficiency under which a secured party and debtor could agree to
use a standard, published price guide (e.g., automobile "blue
book") to establish the credit toward the secured debt.98
The issue again came before the Drafting Committee at its November 1-3,
1996 meeting. At the outset of the meeting, it was announced that certain
important consumer creditor organizations, viz., Ford Motor Credit
Company, General Motors Acceptance Corporation, Chrysler Financial
Corporation, and the American Financial Services Association, were
withdrawing from their participation with the Benfield Subcommittee because
"nothing in the proposed revision would lead [them] to support the final
revisions, and [their] continued participation in the Subcommittee
proceedings might be misconstrued as support."99 These consumer creditors
expressed concern about the consumer proposals in general, not just those
pertaining to deficiency claims:
We have spent a considerable amount of time with the Consumer
Credit Subcommittee over the past two years, but in our opinion the
consumer proposals do little if anything to improve the system-even
for defaulting debtors-while adding considerable dead weight costs
that must be borne by our industry or by paying consumers. The
current law works very well, and any changes which raise the cost of
consumer credit should be supported by a showing that there is
demonstrable harm, that the suggested change will remedy that harm,
and that the proposed benefits outweigh the costs involved. These
principles seem to have been ignored."°
The Reporters began the discussion of deficiency claims with the
suggestion that Alternative 5 afforded the best alternative for getting a
consensus for resolution of the issue, i.e., "Provide explicitly in the statute
that the 'price' received in a disposition is a 'term' of a disposition that must
be commercially reasonable."' 0 '
Although I preferred the more straightforward fair value concept, I
expressed willingness to support that proposal as a compromise because I
98. Id. at 2.
99. Letter from Edward . Heiser, Jr., Esq. of Milwaukee, Wisc. to Prof. Marion W. Benfield, Jr.,
et al. 2 (Oct. 31, 1996) (on file with the Washington University Law Quarterly).
100. Id. at 1-2.
101. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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considered it to be sufficiently close to my perception of fair value or fair
foreclosure value or reasonable foreclosure value."2 Discussion of the issue
was quite limited. Few details of price as a term of commercial
reasonableness were furnished, and none of the other alternatives in the
Reporters' Memoranda,0 3 except for fair value (Alternative 2) were
mentioned. Some of the Drafting Committee members, however, expressed
concern about the uncertainty of the commercially reasonable price concept
and its possible ramifications. These members preferred to limit relief to those
circumstances where there were "nominal" or "outrageously low" foreclosure
sale prices. By a narrow margin, the Drafting Committee indicated a
preference for the commercially reasonable price proposal and requested the
Reporters to draft proposed statutory language for consideration by the
Drafting Committee at its March 7-9, 1997 meeting.
Reflecting on this discussion during the meeting, it became apparent to me
that it would not be sufficient for the statutory language to just add price to
the concept of commercial reasonableness. If that approach merely treated
price as one of several factors in the determination of commercial
reasonableness, attention to the importance of the foreclosure sale price or bid
in the calculation of a deficiency claim might be diluted. Conversely, that
approach might carry with it unnecessary and inappropriate baggage in those
circumstances where the price or bid was found to be commercially
unreasonable, particularly in consumer transactions, e.g., an absolute bar to
any deficiency and harsh statutory damages." If the proposal was to succeed,
it was crucial that it be formulated in balanced terms that offer both debtors
and secured parties benefits that are not available under present law, without
at the same time precluding meaningful relief for the former or causing harsh
consequences to the latter.
Consequently, during the course of the meeting, I drafted a compromise
proposal, which I discussed briefly with some members of the Drafting
102. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
104. Under UCC section 9-507(1) such damages are "an amount not less than the credit service
charge plus ten per cent of the principal amount of the debt or the time price differential plus 10 per
cent of the cash price." U.C.C. § 9-507(1) (1995). This can be a very large amount and, in class
actions, could be draconian. Draft section 9-624(c) continues that formulation, viz., "an amount equal
to the interest or finance charges plus 10 percent of the principal amount of the obligation," except that
the statutory damages are reduced by "any amount by which any consumer obligor's personal liability
for a deficiency is eliminated or reduced under Section 9-625 [either the absolute bar or rebuttable
presumption rule] and any amount for which the secured party is liable under subsection (b) [actual
damages]." Feb. 1997 Draft. Art. 9. supra note 22, § 9-624(c).
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Committee, as well as representatives of the consumer and consumer creditor
groups. This proposal, which did not purport to set forth a precise statutory
formulation was advanced in the following memorandum. 5 which I. sent to
the Drafting Committee, the Benfield Subcommittee, and other interested
persons immediately after the meeting:
Inasmuch as we did not reach a consensus at our weekend meeting,
here is a proposal for the resolution of the above issue which I believe
offers enough benefits to both consumers and consumer creditors so as
to provide a workable compromise. Like any good compromise, it will
not make everyone completely happy. But, the alternative of not
resolving the issue should be much less acceptable to both groups and
to the Drafting Committee.
Although I have shown and discussed most of this proposal with
Gail Hillebrand and Ed Heiser, both of whom seem to have some
interest, neither has seen this latest version or had an opportunity to
discuss it with their colleagues. I expect that both groups will have
some reservations. For my part, however, I do not see much room for
further compromise. The proposal is very delicately balanced, and I
would be concerned that changes may upset that balance.The elements
of the compromise are:
1. It uses price or credit as an element of "commercial
reasonableness" instead of the "fair value" concept which I have
advocated, even though I prefer the latter.
2. This use of "commercially reasonable price or credit" is
limited to the calculation of a deficiency or the existence of a
surplus. (A secured creditor is given the option to allow a credit that
is higher than the foreclosure sale price in calculating a deficiency.)
For all other purposes, however, "commercial reasonableness" is
only a matter of procedure. Thus, if the secured creditor is not
making a deficiency claim or the debtor is not claiming a surplus,
the price or credit at the foreclosure sale is completely irrelevant.
3. The proposal avoids the baggage potentially attendant to a
general use of "commercially reasonable" price or credit. Thus, if
105. Memorandum from Donald J. Rapson to Article 9 Drafting Committee (Nov. 4, 1996) (on
file with the Washington University Law Quarterly).
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the foreclosure sale is procedurally commercially reasonable, a
determination that the price or credit was not commercially
reasonable would not result in the application of the "absolute bar"
rule or in statutory damages.
4. The proposal covers all deficiency claims, i.e., commercial
and consumer, regardless of the identity of the purchaser. However,
unless there is a determination that the price or bid used by the
secured party in calculating the deficiency is so markedly lower
than what a commercially reasonable sale should have realized so
as to not be in good faith, the only consequence of the price or bid
being commercially unreasonable is that in order for the secured
party to recover a deficiency, it must then prove its deficiency
claim under the "rebuttable presumption" rule.
5. Recognizing that there must be some deterrence with
sanctions against calculating deficiency claims on the basis of
prices or bids that are so markedly low as to not be in good faith,
the proposal provides for the debtor to recover the reasonable
attorney's fees and expenses incurred in challenging such claims.
6. Consumers may say that the proposal cuts back on consumer
rights and remedies in some jurisdictions where by statute or
decisional law, price or fair value is already an element of
commercial reasonableness. I understand the argument that
consumers should not have to give up those protections. By the
same token, however, there are many jurisdictions where
consumers do not have the rights and remedies afforded by the
proposal. In those jurisdictions there is a perception that procedural
commercial reasonableness without regard to the price or credit is
all that is required. Consumer creditors are understandably loathe to
move from that position without some trade-offs, i.e., relief from
the absolute bar rule and statutory damages. (If a state adopts the
"absolute bar" option being proposed by the Drafting Committee, it
would still be applicable to all aspects of commercial
unreasonableness other than price or bid.) Because there is some
merit on both sides, the proposal takes the position that there should
be a "clean slate" going forward in the interests of clarity and in
having a uniform rule.
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7. Finally, commercial creditors who do not face the "absolute
bar" rule or statutory damages, need to be protected against
transaction costs resulting from the possibility of increased
litigation of deficiency claims. To that end, the proposal makes it
clear that a "commercially reasonable" price or a bid is not
synonymous with fair market value. Rather, the price or bid need
only be within a range of what should have been realized from a
commercially reasonable sale. As long as the deficiency claim is
calculated on the basis of a price or bid that falls within that range,
the claim should be enforced.
In summary, the respective benefits to debtors and secured creditors
are as follows:
Benefits to Debtors:
1. Allows challenges to deficiency claims in all cases based on
"commercially reasonable price or bid," notwithstanding
procedural commercial reasonableness.
2. Provides incentives to challenging deficiency claims based on
markedly low bids that are not in good faith, by permitting debtors
to recover reasonable attorney's fees and expenses incurred in
making successful challenges to such claims.
3. Deters deficiency claims that are not based on a commercially
reasonable price or bid.
Benefits to Secured Creditors:
1. Eliminates the "absolute bar" rule in cases where there is
compliance with procedural commercial reasonableness and the
only element of commercial unreasonableness is the price or bid, in
which event the "rebuttable presumption" rule is applicable.
2. Eliminates liability for statutory damages where the only
element of commercial unreasonableness is the price or bid.
3. Allows the secured creditor, at its option, to calculate a
deficiency on the basis of a credit that is higher than the foreclosure
sale price in order to facilitate an amicable resolution of its
deficiency claim.
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PROPOSAL
This section only applies to a sale or disposition of the collateral
that is made in compliance with the procedures required by Sections 9-
607 through 9-614 and 9-618 to 9-620.
(1) A secured party who seeks to enforce or collect a deficiency
claim shall calculate the deficiency on the basis of a commercially
reasonable (i) price paid at the sale or disposition or (ii) credit made
against the obligation.
(2) A price or bid may be commercially reasonable even though
it is less than fair market value. If the price or bid is within a range
of the net proceeds that should have been realized from a sale or
disposition of the collateral made in compliance with the
procedures required under this article, it is commercially
reasonable. A secured party complies with subsection (1) if it
calculates a deficiency on the basis of such a price, or at its option,
on the basis of a credit in a higher amount that is within such range.
(3) If the secured party does not seek to enforce or collect a
deficiency claim, the price paid at the sale or disposition or the
credit made against the obligation shall not be a factor in
determining the existence of commercial reasonableness under
Section 9-610, except for purposes of determining whether the
debtor is entitled to a surplus.
(4) A secured party who fails to comply with subsection (1)
shall then be entitled to enforce or collect the deficiency claim only
if it proves that the net proceeds of a commercially reasonable price
that would have been paid at the sale or disposition of the collateral
is less than the obligation owed by the debtor, and the deficiency
shall then be calculated on the basis of that price. If the price or bid
used by the secured party in its initial calculation of the deficiency
was so markedly lower than the net proceeds that should have been
realized from a commercially reasonable sale or disposition of the
collateral as to not be in good faith, the secured party shall be liable
for reasonable attorney's fees and expenses incurred by the debtor
in having the deficiency claim eliminated or reduced. The secured
party shall also be subject to the remedies provided under Section
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9-624, except that it shall not be liable for statutory damages.1 6
The only direct response to the memorandum came from Gail Hillebrand
of Consumers Union, one of the consumer representatives. 07 As anticipated,
there were some concerns with my proposal and a suggested counter-
proposal. The consumer credit organizations for their part opted, instead, to
submit "a comprehensive revision to Part 6 of [draft] Article 9 as it deals with
consumer credit," which included, inter alia, various different proposals for
dealing with deficiency actions.'
On December 13, 1996, the Reporters reviewed the October 1996 Draft
Revisions to Article 9 with the Council of The American Law Institute. The
subject of deficiency actions was discussed. Later in the day, the Reporters
gave an overview of the proposed revisions at an ALI-ABA program on the
UCC and indicated that the Council had expressed its support for a revision
dealing with this subject, particularly in those circumstances where the
purchaser at the foreclosure sale is the secured party or one with whom it has
an affiliation or relationship."° This was a promising development.
The recent proposals from the consumer representatives and the consumer
creditors were sufficiently far apart as to make it unlikely that these two
groups would be able to fashion a compromise proposal among themselves.
Accordingly, it became incumbent upon the Drafting Committee to develop,
on its own, a proposal on deficiency claims, which offers sufficient benefits
for each group so as to deter them from rejecting the proposal. I believe that
the compromise proposal set forth above"0 provided a framework for
accomplishing that objective.
D. The Drafting Committee in 1997: Accomplishment
The Reporters focused upon the issue in the February 1997 Draft and
offered two approaches. The Prefatory Notes to Part 6 explain:
106. Id.
107. Letter from Gail Hillebrand, Consumers Union to Donald J. Rapson, The CIT Group, Inc.
(Nov. 26, 1996) (on file with the Washington University Law Quarterly).
108. Letter from Edward . Heiser, Jr., Esq. to William M. Burke (Jan. 15, 1997) with attached
Representatives of Consumer Creditors, Proposed Amendments to the October 15, 1996 Draft of
Proposed Revisions to Article 9 (Jan. 1997) (on file with the Washington University Law Quarterly).
109. Professors Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Emerged and Emerging New
Uniform Commercial Code, Remarks at the Eighth Annual Advanced ALI-ABA Course of Study,
New York, New York (Dec. 13, 1996).
110. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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1. Consistent with the Drafting Committee's division of
views on the subject, this draft offers two alternative
approaches for dealing with dispositions of collateral that
are in all respects commercially reasonable as a
procedural matter but which produce proceeds of a very
low amount.
2. Under either approach, the Drafting Committee must
answer one common question: Will the special rules
apply in all cases of very low amounts of proceeds or
only when, in addition, the purchaser is the secured party,
an affiliate of the secured party, or a secondary obligor. If
applicable only in the latter set of circumstances, it will
be necessary to provide a definition of "affiliate." In this
regard, consider the Bankruptcy Code's definition of
"affiliate," in 11 U.S.C. § 10 1(2):
(A) entity that directly or indirectly owns, controls,
or holds with power to vote, 20 percent or more
of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor,
other than an entity that holds such securities-
(i) in a fiduciary or agency capacity
without sole discretionary power to vote
such securities; or
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if such entity has
not in fact exercised such power to vote;
(B) corporation 20 percent or more of whose
outstanding voting securities are directly or
indirectly owned, controlled, or held with power
to vote, by the debtor, or by an entity that
directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds
with power to vote, 20 percent or more of the
outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other
than an entity that holds such securities-
(i) in a fiduciary or agency capacity
without sole discretionary power to vote
such securities; or
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(ii) solely to secure a debt, if such entity has
not in fact exercised such power to vote;
(C) person whose business is operated under a lease
or operating agreement by a debtor, or person
substantially all of whose property is operated
under an operating agreement with the debtor; or
(D) entity that operates the business or substantially
all of the property of the debtor under a lease or
operating agreement.
3. One approach is reflected in the bracketed revisions to
§ 9-610(b). Under these revisions, the amount of
proceeds received by a secured party in a disposition
would be a term of the disposition that must be
commercially reasonable. If the secured party's receipt of
a very low amount of proceeds is not commercially
reasonable, the provisions dealing with the effect of the
secured party's noncompliance with part 6 (primarily,
§ 9-625) would apply. However, bracketed versions of
§§ 9-624 and 9-625 (Alternative A) would make the
statutory damages and absolute bar provisions in
consumer secured transactions inapplicable when the
only noncompliance is a low amount of proceeds.
4. The other approach is reflected in the bracketed revisions
to § 9-614, which deals with the calculation of a surplus
and a deficiency. Under these revisions, if the secured
party receives an unreasonably low amount in a
disposition, the surplus and deficiency would not be
calculated based on the actual proceeds received but
would be recalculated based on an amount of proceeds
that is not unreasonably low. This approach would not
raise the need for adjustments to §§ 9-624 and 9-625
inasmuch as the low price would not, of itself, constitute
noncompliance with the statute."'
111. Feb. 1997 Draft, Art. 9, supra note 22, pt. 6 rptr.'s prefatory notes.
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Both approaches cover commercial and consumer transactions. This was
based upon the Drafting Committee's decisions in June 1995 and June
1996.1 12
The matter was discussed by the Drafting Committee at its meeting on
March 7-9, 1997. First, there was unanimous preference for the approach in
section 9-614 which deals solely with the calculation of a surplus and a
deficiency, rather than making the foreclosure sale price a term of
"commercial reasonableness." Under that approach, "commercial
reasonableness" is strictly a matter of procedural compliance, and the
reasonableness of the foreclosure sale price or credit is treated separately in
the context where it is most relevant-deficiency claims. Thus, if there is a
determination that the foreclosure sales price or bid was "unreasonably low,"
the only consequence is a readjustment of the deficiency. If the sale
procedurally is otherwise "commercially reasonable," there would be no
application of an absolute bar rule or imposition of statutory damages. This is
consistent with the compromise proposal I advanced in November 1996."'
The Drafting Committee then discussed the question posed by the
Reporters in the Prefatory Note: "Will the special rules apply in all cases of
very low amount of proceeds or only when, in addition, the purchaser is the
secured party, an affiliate of the secured party, or a secondary obligor?"
Although I preferred that the rule cover all deficiency claims, the majority of
the Drafting Committee voted to limit coverage to the latter group-i.e., the
circumstances where the problem is most acute. The effect of this decision
was to approve Alternative A to proposed section 9-614(e) which provides:
(e) If the amount of proceeds received by the secured party in a
disposition is unreasonably low and the purchaser in the disposition is
the secured party, an affiliate of the secured party, or a secondary
obligor, the surplus or deficiency under subsection (d) is calculated
based on the proceeds that would have been realized in a commercially
reasonable disposition to a purchaser other than the secured party, an
affiliate of the secured party, or a secondary obligor.'
4
I am gratified with this result. More, however, remains to be done. The
rule requires a fact-sensitive determination of the amount of proceeds that
112. See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
114. Feb. 1997 Draft, Art. 9, supra note 22, § 9-614(e) alt.A.
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"would have been realized in a commercially reasonable disposition to a
purchaser other than the secured party, an affiliate of the secured party, or a
secondary obligor.""' 5 Comments will have to be written which provide
meaningful guidance to the fact-finder by setting forth the various factors
which should be considered in making that determination. The substance of
these Comments will be important and, perhaps controversial. I am confident,
nevertheless, that this can be done. In my view, the eight categories of factors
described in subsection (b) of my earlier proposal should be the starting basis
of the Comments."
6
The next step in the process will take place in May 1997 when the latest
draft of Article 9 will be briefly considered by The American Law Institute at
its Annual Meeting in Washington, D.C. and in July 1997 when there will be
a first reading of the entire draft before the Annual Meeting of NCCUSL in
Sacramento, California. The decisions of the Drafting Committee deserve
support, and I am optimistic about the eventual result.
III. CONCLUSION
There should be no disagreement with the proposition that a secured party
"is not entitled to recover more than the full amount" of the debt. That is the
premise of the fair value rule,"17 which is the established majority rule in real
property security law" 8 and was applied to personal property security law in
some states prior to the adoption of UCC Article 9,'9 and is presently applied
in some states.'20
In imposing a duty of commercial reasonableness upon secured parties in
the enforcement of their rights upon default under Article 9, Grant Gilmore,
the principal architect of Article 9, viewed that duty as the conceptual
equivalent of a fiduciary obligation---"[t]he obligation of the secured party is
to use his best efforts to see that the highest price is received for the
collateral."'' Gilmore viewed the Code procedures of public sale,
notification, and publicity "[a]s the best way to produce a fair price."'2 The
115. Id
116. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
118. RESTATEMENT OF MORTGAGES, supra note 14, § 8A.
119. See sources cited supra note 15.
120. See sources cited supra note 16.
121. 2 GILMORE, supra note 2, § 44.5, at 1232-34; supra note 41.
122. Id § 44.6, at 1245.
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concept of fair value is completely consistent with that objective.'2 3
Somehow that message has been lost in the interpretation and application
of commercial reasonableness. Gilmore himself stumbled in applying that
standard to the "really serious problem" of the common circumstance where,
despite compliance with the procedures of commercial reasonableness, no
bidders appear and the secured party bids in the collateral 24 -Case #2.25 As
a matter of basic justice, logic, and intellectual consistency, the fair value rule
should be applicable in both commercial and consumer transactions whenever
the secured party seeks to enforce a deficiency claim because the established
real estate rule and the duty of commercial reasonableness were both
designed to achieve the same goal of realizing fair value." 6
Fair value does not necessarily mean fair market value. The application of
that standard should not result in the imposition of unrealistic, unfair, or
burdensome duties upon secured parties. Fair value is not a fixed amount-
rather it should be viewed as a range of values, and, as long as the debtor
receives a credit against his or her obligation that falls within that range in the
calculation of a deficiency, the secured party has complied with its
obligations. If recharacterization of fair value as fair foreclosure value or
reasonable foreclosure value will contribute to a better understanding of that
concept, let it be done.'27 The goal is to prevent deficiency claims from being
calculated on the basis of foreclosure sale prices or bids that are unreasonably
low.
12
I would prefer that the forthcoming revision of Article 9 make something
akin to the fair value concept applicable to all deficiency claims. The rule
adopted by the Drafting Committee only covers cases where the proceeds of
the sale or disposition are "unreasonably low' 129 and is limited to the
circumstance where the secured party, a related party, or a recourse party bids
in and becomes the purchaser at the foreclosure sale, e.g., Case #2.30
Certainly, that is the "really serious problem'' and the circumstance most
susceptible to abusive and improper deficiency claims. The Drafting
123. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
124. 2 GILMORE, supra note 2, § 44.6, at 1243, 1245.
125. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
126. 2 GILMORE, supra note 2, § 44.5, at 1233-34.
127. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
131. 2 GILMORE, supra note 2, § 44.5, at 1243.
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Committee's rule governs those instances where the purchaser is the (i)
secured party; (ii) an affiliate or insider of the secured party; or (iii) a person
liable to the secured party under a guaranty, indorsement, repurchase
agreement, or the like "i.e. secondary obligor."' Inasmuch as those
categories appear to generally exclude all instances where the purchaser is an
independent third party, broader application of the rule may not be needed.'
Indeed, the proposed statute expressly requires that there be a determination
of what "would have been realized in a commercially reasonable disposition
to a purchaser other than"'34 someone in the three enumerated categories. It
should be an acceptable compromise.
Although it is probably unrealistic to expect that the Drafting Committee's
decision will be supported by all representatives of secured creditors or all
representatives of consumer and other debtor groups, I believe that there will
be general support for the proposed rule. It is a moderate, balanced and
meaningful approach to a difficult and controversial issue. From the
perspective of debtors, it focuses on those circumstances where the problem is
most acute. I expect that most consumer groups will support an enactment of
this proposed rule even though it does not go as far as they would have
preferred. Secured creditors, for their part, should approach the matter
objectively and not quarrel with a rule that requires them to defend their
calculation of deficiency claims in those circumstances where, because of the
potential lack of genuine competitive bidding, the foreclosure sale price or bid
may not reasonably reflect the value of the collateral. Moreover, even though
the proposed rule may expose secured creditors to additional challenges of
'deficiency claims in those instances, the corollary abolition of the absolute
bar rule and liability for statutory damages are meaningful off-setting benefits
for consumer creditors. In my view, creditor groups would be short sighted
and ill-advised to oppose enactment of this rule or the overall revision of
Article 9.135
132. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
133. If, however, the secured party can then recover the balance of the obligation from a
secondary obligor, there may not be sufficient incentive to realize a higher price at the foreclosure sale.
That is the reason for the addition of category (iv) to the proposal. See supra note 88.
134. Feb. 1997 Draft, Art. 9, supra note 22, § 9-614(e) alt.A (emphasis added).
135. For example, at the March 7-9, 1997 meeting of the Drafting Committee, approval was given
to the addition of two consumer creditor protection provisions based on section 130 of the Federal
Truth-in-Lending Act: (i) a good faith error defense relieving the creditor from statutory damages for
failure to comply with the provisions of Article 9 governing default where the error "was not
intentional and resulted from a good-faith error notwithstanding the secured party's maintenance of
procedures reasonably adapted to avoid the failure" and (ii) a limitation of recoveries in class actions
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I hope that this article will contribute to a better understanding of the issue
and develop wide-spread support for the rule being proposed by the Article 9
Drafting Committee. It represents an important improvement and clarification
of present law. Gilmore would have repented and agreed.
to the lesser of S500,000 or one per centum of the net worth of the creditor (not yet drafted). See 15
U.S.C. § 1630(a)(2)(B), (C) (1994); Feb. 1997 Draft, Art. 9, supra note 22, § 9-627(d).
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APPENDIX 1
MEMORANDUM TO: Article 9 Drafting Committee
FROM: Stephen L. Harris and Charles W. Mooney, Jr.,
Reporters
DATE: July 30, 1996
RE: Alternative approaches toward low-price
foreclosure sales to the secured party or a
related party
On several occasions a few people have suggested that the calculation of
a deficiency should be based on the value of collateral instead of the net
proceeds of a disposition. They expressed concern that even a commercially
reasonable disposition (i.e., one that is procedurally correct with respect to
advertising and the like) may produce a very small price that is substantially
less than the value of the collateral.
The Drafting Committee consistently has decided to retain net proceeds as
the basis for calculating a deficiency when a disposition is commercially
reasonable, as under current law. At its June meeting, however, the Drafting
Committee renewed its request that we consider and suggest alternatives for
dealing with "self-dealing" transactions in which the purchaser is the secured
party, a person closely related or connected to the secured party, or a recourse
party. (We had suspended any efforts to address this problem until the
consumer transactions sub-committee completed its work.) The thought is
that addressing the self-dealing situations may effectively address the great
majority of the low-price dispositions as well.
The purpose of this memo is to solicit your preliminary views on some
alternative approaches, with a view toward incorporating one or more of them
into the draft to be considered at the November meeting of the Drafting
Committee. For present purposes, we shall assume that devising an
acceptable definition of "related party," "affiliate," or similar term is
possible. (We would, of course, be happy to receive your suggestions for the
definition.)
Please review the alternatives and let one of us know your reactions to
them no later than the end of August. In particular, we would like to
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know which of the alternatives you believe to be the most promising
approach and which you find the least promising.
[*2'] Alternatives 3, 4A, 4B, and 5 are inspired in part by Luize
Zubrow's article in 42 UCLA L. Rev. 445 (1994). For the June, 1995,
Draffing Committee meeting in Washington, we distributed Professor
Zubrow's synopsis of her article. There was little interest in pursuing her
recommendations at that time. However, they now seem particularly relevant
to the Drafting Committee's current interest in pursuing some special
provisions for self-dealing dispositions.
We welcome your comments.
Alternative 1: When the amount of a deficiency is in issue following a
self-dealing disposition, require the secured party to prove with "clear
and convincing evidence" that it complied with the requirements of Part
5.
Alternative 1 would retain the "commercially reasonable" standard
applicable under current law but would impose upon the secured party a
higher burden of proving that its conduct complied with the standard (i.e.,
proving compliance by clear and convincing evidence rather than by evidence
showing that it is more probable than not that the secured party complied).
Alternative 2: Base deficiency calculation on "value" of collateral in
self-dealing dispositions.
For reasons explained in detail at previous meetings, we are not inclined to
support Alternative 2 unless, perhaps, all other approaches fail. Valuation,
especially the valuation of personal property on foreclosure, is inherently
problematic.
Alternative 3: Adopt a procedural standard for self-dealing
dispositions that is more demanding than "commercially reasonable."
Examples include: "reasonably designed to obtain the best possible
price," "reasonably designed to obtain the fair value," and "reasonably
designed to obtain the greatest net proceeds."
Alternative 3 would require all aspects of a self-dealing disposition to be
designed to realize the fair value, best possible price, or a similar standard.
1. [Editor's Note: Star paging reflects the pagination in the original memorandum.]
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Unlike Alternative 2, under Alternative 3 evidence that the actual disposition
price is less than the property's value (however defined) would not be
determinative, although it would be probative. Arguably, however, courts
might find it convenient to apply Alternative 3 much like Alternative 2 would
be applied.
[*3] Alternative 4A: Provide that in a self-dealing disposition a secured
party is a fiduciary that owes a duty of loyalty to the debtor.
Alternative 4B: Adopt Alternative 3 and, in addition, provide that in
a self-dealing disposition a secured party is a fiduciary that owes a duty
of loyalty to the debtor.
Alternatives 4A and 4B would invite courts to apply standards of non-
UCC law applicable to fiduciaries in self-dealing transactions.
Alternative 5: Adopt Alternative 3, 4A, or 4B and, in addition,
provide a safe harbor for the secured party if it makes full disclosure to
the debtor concerning the disposition, undertakes more extensive
advertising, and the debtor approves of the terms of the disposition in
advance.
Alternative 5 would permit a secured party to calculate a deficiency or
surplus based upon the actual net proceeds received, as under current law. To
base the calculations on actual net proceeds, however, the secured party
would be required to disclose to the debtor all material facts concerning the
disposition, undertake more extensive advertising than under current law
(such as including an opening bid for a public sale), and obtain the debtor's
approval before the disposition.
S.L.H. C.W.M.
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APPENDIX 2
MEMORANDUM TO: Article 9 Drafting Committee
FROM: Donald J. Rapson
DATE: August 8, 1996
RE: Alternative approaches toward low-price
foreclosure sales to the secured party or a related
party
This is in response to the Reporters' memorandum dated July 30, 1996
requesting responses to various alternative approaches set forth therein.
I respectfully suggest that the Reporters may be making resolution of the
Drafting Committee's request more difficult than need be. More particularly,
in giving short shrift to Alternative 2 (Base deficiency calculation on "value"
of collateral in self-dealing dispositions) because valuation is "inherently
problematic", the Reporters are being overly resistant to the concept and not
recognizing that this is what many secured lenders routinely do in actual
practice and what many courts do in personal property deficiency actions, e.g.
New Jersey and New York
Initially, it should be noted that the Drafting Committee agreed at its
June 1995 meeting "by a wide margin to ask the Reporters to explore
language affecting the calculation of deficiencies when the secured party buys
the collateral". See Steve Weise's ABA report of that meeting. The Drafting
Committee's approval of the Benfield Consumer Subcommittee
recommendation at the June 1996 meeting was an affirmation of that earlier
decision.
I would also note that the use of the phrase "self-dealing" clouds the
issue in that it suggests that secured or related parties are somehow acting
improperly when they "buy in" at the foreclosure sale. This often happens
even though the foreclosure procedure, in terms of notice, advertising and the
like, is "commercially reasonable" in all respects. The reality is that
foreclosure sales, no matter how impeccably conducted, frequently do not
result in sufficient competitive bidding by third parties and the secured party
has no choice but to "bid in" in the collateral. The "bid" price, however,
often has no relation to the value of the collateral and there is no reason or
incentive for it to reflect that value. "Self-dealing" is not the issue--
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calculation of the deficiency is the problem.
Immediately following the June 1996 Drafting Committee meeting, I
supplied the Reporters and Marion Benfield with a draft proposal for
calculation of the deficiency that would require an adjustment of the
foreclosure sale price "to the extent necessary to approximate a 'fair
foreclosure value' of the collateral at the time of disposition". The proposal
sets forth various factors which should be considered in determining "fair
foreclosure value". The Comment would explain that the objective is to
determine a value that falls within a range that is reasonable under the
circumstances after consideration of these various factors. For example, the
Comment would [*2' ] explain that a foreclosure sale by a financing
institution which is not in the business of selling the particular kind of
collateral should generally be expected to realize proceeds in the range of the
wholesale, as distinguished from, retail value.
At the Reporters' suggestion, I previously sent the proposal to Gail
Hillebrand and Ed Heiser. The proposal, however, was not referred to in the
Reporters' memorandum.
This proposal is based on my personal experiences in handling several
hundred deficiency actions for secured lenders (real and personal property)
during the years I was in private practice and numerous conversations with
several businesspeople at CIT who handle personal property foreclosure sales
and deficiency actions. I have been told that the draft reflects their actual
practices. A copy of the proposal, modified to reflect some suggestions, is
attached.
Let me reiterate, however, that the "fair value" concept in deficiency
actions set forth in this proposal (which does not necessarily mean "fair
market value") is neither new nor particularly controversial. It is the
established majority rule in real property deficiency actions, it was the
legislative rule in some states prior to Article 9, it is the judicial rule in Article
9 deficiency actions in some states, e.g. New Jersey and New York, and is
likely to continue to be the rule in those states even if the Drafting Committee
were to recommend a less protective rule. In my view, all the other
alternatives advanced by the Reporters are significantly more "problematic"
1. [Editor's Note: Star paging reflects the pagination of the original memorandum.]
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than Alternative 2.
I believe that the Reporters are exaggerating the difficulty of making
valuations. Secured lenders do that as part of their regular procedure in
conducting foreclosure sales. Courts and other forums regularly determine
valuation issues and even though the process of dealing with conflicting
expert testimony is sometimes difficult, it is no more so than determining
what is "commercially reasonable". My differences with the Reporters on
this point mirror those expressed in the 5-4 Supreme Court decision in BFT v.
RTC 128 L. Ed.2d 556 (1994), involving the related, but different, issue of
the conclusiveness of a foreclosure sale price for fraudulent transfer purposes.
Justice Souter, who had prior experience as a litigator and state court judge,
in speaking for the dissent cogently rejected the majority's fear of having
judicial determinations of value:
I do not share in my colleagues' apparently extreme discomfort at the
prospect of vesting bankruptcy courts with responsibility for determining
whether "reasonably equivalent value" was received in cases like this one,
nor is the suggestion well taken that doing so is an improper abdication.
Those courts regularly make comparably difficult (and contestable)
determinations about the "reasonably equivalent value" of assets
transferred through other means than foreclosure sales, see e.g. Covey v.
Commercial Nat. Bank, 960 [*3] F.2d 657, 661-662 [26 C.B.C.2d 1046]
(CA7 1992) (rejecting creditor's claim that resale price may be presumed
to be "reasonably equivalent value" when that creditor seiz[es] an asset
and sell[s] it for just enough to cover its loan (even if it would have been
worth substantially more as part of an ongoing enterprise)"); In re Morris
Communications N.C., Inc., 914 F.2d 458 [23 C.B.C.2d 1456] (CA4
1990) (for "reasonably equivalent value" purposes, worth of entry in
cellular phone license "lottery" should be discounted to reflect probability
of winning); cf. In re Royal Coach Country, Inc., 125 B.R. 668, 673-674
(Bkrtcy. Ct. MD Fla. 1991) (avoiding exchange of 1984 truck valued at
$2,800 for 1981 car valued at $500), and there is every reason to believe
that they, familiar with these cases (and with local conditions) as we are
not, will give the term sensible content in evaluating particular transfers on
foreclosure,***". 128 L. Ed.2d. at 578-9.
Moreover, it strikes me that the Reporters are being conceptually
inconsistent. The rebuttable presumption rule in draft § 9-504(c)(2)(ii)(B) on
page 242-3 requires a determination of "the amount of proceeds that would
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have been realized had the noncomplying secured party proceeded in
accordance with Section 9-502, 9-504, or 9-505". That determination of
""amount" is, as a practical matter, essentially the same as the determination of
"fair foreclosure value" because it involves the same proof factors. Today,
when the secured party is found to have not satisfied the "commercial
reasonableness" requirement and has the burden of overcoming the rebuttable
presumption rule in order to enforce a deficiency, it offers evidence as to the
fair value of the collateral which the debtor then challenges. Why is that any
less "problematic"?
Finally, it should be remembered that the Benfield Subcommittee, in
making its recommendation, referred to the recent ALI approval of Section
8.4 of the Restatement of Mortaages. which gives the debtor a right to request
a fair market value determination in all deficiency actions following a real
estate mortgage foreclosure. That rule follows the legislative or judicial rule
in a majority of the states. (A copy of the ALI proposal is attached).
Although the argument can be made that the "commercial reasonableness"
requirement in Article 9 somehow adds a protective factor that is not in most
real estate foreclosure rules, I believe that the argument is more theoretical
than real. As a practical matter there is little difference between a
procedurally correct (i.e. duly noticed and advertised) real estate mortgage
foreclosure sale conducted by and held in the Sheriffs office and a
procedurally correct Article 9 foreclosure sale conducted by the secured party
held on the courthouse steps, a dealer's or empty lot, or in the office of the
secured party or its attorney. If the secured party bids in because the bidding,
if any, does not reach the "upset" or "let-go" price established by the secured
party, that bid does not necessarily reflect the value of the collateral and
should be subject to adjustment if the secured party brings a deficiency claim.
The "fair foreclosure value" concept being advanced here is much narrower
than the Restatement rule and is limited to the circumstance where the
secured party [*4] or a related or recourse party is the purchaser. This
proposal provides a straightforward resolution of the issue, follows a
traditional approach and reflects actual and good business practices.
/s/
DJR/es
Attachments
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APPENDIX 3
MEMORANDUM TO: Article 9 Drafting Committee, Advisors, and
Observers
FROM: Steven L. Harris and Charles W. Mooney, Jr.,
Reporters
DATE: October 10, 1996
RE: Alternative approaches toward low-price
foreclosure sales to the secured party or a
related party
Last summer we distributed a memorandum dated July 30, 1996, which
outlined several alternative approaches for dealing with low-price foreclosure
sales to the secured party or a related party. A copy of the memorandum is
enclosed. Also enclosed are a letter and memorandum from David
McMahon, which we received after preparing our memorandum, along with
several written responses to our memorandum. We received several other
less formal responses, which are not enclosed, some of which took strong
objection to a value-based calculation of a deficiency.
As things stand, there remains a division among the Drafting Committee
and others from whom we have heard. Some favor moving to a value-based
rule, others favor the status quo, and others favor additional alternatives. We
have received no broad support for using a fiduciary standard, although we
have received some very strong opposition to that approach. We also
received little support for enhanced advertising and notification requirements.
A revised set of alternatives follows. Alternatives 1, 2, and 3 remain
unchanged. Alternatives 4 and 5 from our July memorandum have been
deleted. We have added three new alternatives (4, 5, and 6). Each of these
new alternatives might avoid the need to test self-dealing (and similar)
transactions under a special standard.
Alternative 1: When the amount of a deficiency is in issue following a
self-dealing disposition, require the secured party to prove with "clear
and convincing evidence" that it complied with the requirements of Part
5.
Alternative 2: Base the deficiency calculation on the "value" of
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collateral in self-dealing dispositions.
Alternative 3: Adopt a procedural standard for self-dealing
dispositions that is more demanding than "commercially reasonable."
Examples include: "reasonably designed to obtain the [*21 ] best possible
price," "reasonably designed to obtain the fair value," and "reasonably
designed to obtain the greatest possible net proceeds."
Alternative 4: Adopt a standard for self-dealing dispositions under
which a disposition yielding proceeds less than the reasonably equivalent
value would not be in compliance. The reasonably equivalent value,
then, would be used to establish the deficiency.
Alternative 4 contemplates the use of "reasonably equivalent value" as
interpreted under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act and Bankruptcy Code
§ 548. In effect, if the disposition would have been avoidable under the (pre-
BFP) Durrett line of cases, it would not comply with Article 9.
Alternative 5: Provide explicitly in the statute that the "price"
received in a disposition is a "term" of a disposition that must be
commercially reasonable.
The Drafting Committee has not discussed this approach in some time.
When last addressed, the Committee members were divided. This approach
would avoid some of the difficulties of requiring a valuation for every
deficiency claim while providing that an unreasonably low price cannot be
the basis of the deficiency calculation.
Alternative 6: Adopt a permissible procedure for calculating a
deficiency under which a secured party and debtor could agree to use a
standard, published price guide (e.g., automobile "blue book") to
establish the credit toward the secured debt.
This proposal is explained in David McMahon's enclosed letter and
memorandum. (We realize that it has not been proposed as an alternative to
the other proposals but could be adopted in addition to another alternative.)
We hope that the foregoing and the enclosures will be useful in the effort
to reach a consensus.
1. [Editor's Note: Star paging reflects the pagination of the original memorandum.]
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